

Washington Security and Defense Seminar (WSDS 2021)

VIRTUAL COURSE SYLLABUS AND RECOMMENDED READING

15-19 November 2021

Director, WJPC
LTG (Ret.) Frederick S. Rudesheim

Academic Dean
Dr. Scott Tollefson, PhD

Course Director:
Dr. Pat Paterson, PhD

Deputy Director:
Dr. Fabiana Sofia Perera, PhD



WILLIAM J. PERRY CENTER *for*
HEMISPHERIC DEFENSE STUDIES

National Defense University
Abraham Lincoln Hall
260 5th Avenue, Building 64
Washington, DC 20319-5066

Layout Design: Viviana Edwards | *Multimedia Specialist* | vivian.edwards@ndu.edu

Copies of the Perry Center publications can be obtained on the Perry Center website at: www.williamjperrycenter.org

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Mission:

The Perry Center develops and engages the Western Hemisphere's community of defense and security professionals to seek mutually supportive approaches to common challenges in order to develop effective sustainable institutional capacity and promote a greater understanding of US regional policy.

Brief History:

The William J. Perry Center, originally known as the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies (CHDS), was born out of the first Defense Ministerial of the Americas (DMA) in Williamsburg, Virginia, in 1995, a conference established by then-US Secretary of Defense William J. Perry to convene defense ministers from around the hemisphere to discuss shared defense and security issues. At the inaugural assembly, participating officials expressed two concerns: the need to strengthen ties between civilian and military officials in hemispheric defense ministries and the need to increase the number of qualified civilian professionals trained to deal with defense issues. In response to these quandaries, during the second DMA held in Bariloche, Argentina, in 1996, Secretary Perry proposed creating a regional center dedicated to training civilian defense officials and conducting educational activities to bring military and civilian leaders together to discuss important defense and security challenges. Driven by the consensus that mutual security was dependent on the stability of democratic states, as well as transparency and accountability in the defense and security sectors, participating officials agreed that only through openness, the free exchange of ideas, and greater trust could a more stable hemispheric and global security environment be achieved.

Between 1996 and September 1997, preparatory work for what became CHDS was conducted by a team from the US Department of Defense and the National Defense University which included consultation with regional stakeholders such as the defense ministries and civilian academics. Inaugurated on 17 September 1997, CHDS opened its doors. The following day, the Center's first event kicked off: a 2-day Hemispheric Conference on Education and Defense. Its first director, COL (ret.) John Cope, and two faculty members officially reported for duty in December. CHDS conducted its first three-week course, the Defense Planning and Resource Management Courses in March 1998. The Center also conducted the first of many in-region seminars in Bolivia that year.

On April 2, 2013, the Center officially became known as the William J. Perry Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies (The Perry Center) in commemoration of its founder, the 19th Secretary of Defense, Dr. William J. Perry. In June 2014, the Office of the Secretary of Defense appointed Mr. Mark Wilkins as Director. In collaboration with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Mr. Wilkins initiated a strategic reassessment of the Center's mission and goals that culminated in a new set of priorities for the future, including support for the Department of Defense's Defense Institution Building (DIB) initiative. The Center's current director, LTG (ret.) Frederick S. Rudesheim, began his tenure in February 2018.

Recognizing the need for stronger government institutions and more proficient civilian and military defense leadership in Central America, the Center will act as a catalyst to incubate, enhance and sustain transparent and capable defense and security governance institutions that encourage democratic values, rule of law, and good governance—as well as promote key defense strategic interests and secure security cooperation investments. The Center will accomplish this mission by building institutional capacity through the development of professional ministry-level officials, promoting civilian control of the military, and, with the support of stakeholders, developing and facilitating the implementation of national defense strategies and policies.

The Center continues to evolve, using education, outreach, strategic communications, and research to achieve an expanded mission of bolstering partner capacity and strengthening trust, mutual understanding of US and regional defense and international security policy issues, and regional collaboration in order to ensure a more stable and secure hemisphere.

Leadership:

LTG (Ret.) Frederick S. Rudesheim,
Perry Center, Director

Mr. Jeffrey Murphy,
Deputy Director/Chief of Staff

Dr. Scott Tollefson,
Dean of Academic Affairs

Ms. Darla Jordan,
Director of Strategic Communication

COL Robert Alvaro,
Chief of Security Cooperation and Inter-Agency Integration

Ms. Linda Denning,
Chief of Operations and Student Affairs

COL (Ret.) Patrick Mathes,
Perry Center Representative to US SOUTHCOM

Course Objectives

One of the mandates for the William J. Perry Center from the Office of the Secretary of Defense is to educate partner nation personnel on security and defense policies in the United States of America. With that task in mind, the Perry Center offers the Washington Security and Defense Seminar (WSDS), an annual course that is specifically designed with the Latin American and Caribbean diplomatic community in mind.

During the one-week course, participants examine the issues and perspectives of key national goals, preferences in terms of strategies, policy guidance, and the dynamics of decision making in a democratic society. In an academic environment of non-attribution, participants have the unique experience of listening to and exchanging ideas with key US civilian and military officials who work in subjects related to the Western Hemisphere. Representatives of the US Executive Branch, US Congress, the Department of Defense (J-5 and the Office of Secretary of Defense), the State Department, the National Security Council, the Department of Homeland Security, and other academic experts provides a variety of perspectives on the responsibilities, bureaucratic processes, and policy challenges faced by the United States as it develops its national security policy and strategy. The curriculum combines academic conferences and meetings with official representatives with dialogue and discussions moderated by Perry Center professors. U.S. personnel who work in Latin America and the Caribbean region may also benefit from hearing strategy and policy presentations from U.S. stakeholders. Additionally, U.S. participants may garner information on the perspectives of our partner nations as they ask questions and present their opinions on course topics.

As a result of attendance in this course, participants should be able to:

- Remember key factors defining the environment for the security and defense of the United States.
- Understand the national and international structures and processes that affect the development of US security and defense policy.
- Understand the roles of the various agencies with responsibility for security and defense of the United States.
- Understand how security and defense policy is formulated and implemented particularly in regard to the US policy toward other nations in the Western Hemisphere.

Course Schedule

November 15 - 19, 2021

DAY 1 Monday, 15 Nov 2021	Day 2 Tuesday, 16 Nov 2021
Keynote Speaker and Climate Change Panel	Us Foreign and Regional Policy
0900-0910 Director's Welcome LTG (Ret.) Frederick S. Rudesheim	0900-0910 Daily Introduction
0910-0920 NDU President's Welcome LtGen Michael Plehn, USAF	0910-1030 <u>U.S. Foreign Policy</u> Dr. Daniel Drezner Fletcher School of Diplomacy Dr. Matthew Kroenig Georgetown University Moderator: Dr. Pat Paterson
0920-0930 WJPC Organizational Brief Dr. Scott Tollefson, Academic Dean	1030-1045 BREAK
0930-1045 <u>Climate Change Panel</u> Ms. Erin Sikorsky Director, Center for Climate and Security Dr. Annalise Blum OSD Climate Office Moderator: Dr. Pat Paterson	1045-1215 <u>U.S. Regional Policy</u> AMB Tom Shannon Former Dep Sec State Dr. Cynthia McClintock George Washington University Moderator: Dr. Fabiana Perera
1045-1105 BREAK	
1105-1205 Keynote Address Dr. Hal Brands, JHU SAIS Moderator: Dr. Scott Tollefson	
1205-1215 Day #1 Closing Remarks	

Day 3 Wednesday, 17 Nov 2021	Day 4 Thursday, 18 Nov 2021	Day 5 Friday, 19 Nov 2021
US defense and Military Strategy	Corruption and Foreign Assistance	Budget Process and Cyber Security
0900-0910 Daily Introduction	0900-0910 Daily Introduction	0900-0910 Daily Introduction
0910-1030 <u>U.S. Military Strategy</u> Dr. Richard H. Kohn <i>Univ of N. Carolina, Chapel Hill</i> Dr. Kori Schake <i>American Enterprise Institute</i> Moderator: Dr. David Spencer	0910-1030 <u>U.S. Perspective on Corruption</u> Dr. Kurt Weyland <i>University of Texas, Austin</i> Dr. Louise Shelley <i>George Mason University</i> Moderator: Dr. Bill Godnick	0910-1030 <u>The U.S. Budget Process</u> Dr. Thomas G. Mahnken <i>President, CSBA</i> Mr. Mark Cancian <i>CSIS</i> Moderator: Dr. Fabiana Perera
1030-1045 BREAK	1030-1045 BREAK	1030-1045 BREAK
1045-1215 <u>U.S. Security/Defense Perspectives in Latin America</u> OSD Panelist: Daniel Erikson <i>DASD WHA</i> SC Panelist: LtGen Andrew Croft <i>MDC U.S. Southern CMD</i> NC Panelist: TBD Moderator: LTG (Ret.) Frederick Rudesheim	1045-1100 Perry Center Outreach Brief 1100-1215 <u>Foreign Aid and Security Assistance</u> LTG (Ret.) David Barno <i>JHU SAIS</i> Dr. Paul Angelo <i>CFR</i> Moderator: Dr. Pat Paterson	1045-1200 <u>Cyber Security</u> Dr. Melissa Griffith <i>Wilson Center</i> General de Brigada Porfirio Fuentes, Mexican Army <i>Director General, IADB</i> <i>Secretariat</i> Moderator: Dr. Boris Saavedra 1200-1215 Concluding Remarks

DAY-BY-DAY SCHEDULE, BIOGRAPHIES, AND READINGS

DAY 1

Monday, 15 November 2021 / lunes, 15 de noviembre 2021

Keynote Speaker and Climate Change Panel

- 0900-0910 Director's Welcome / Bienvenida al Centro Perry**
LTG (Ret.) Frederick S. Rudesheim
Director, William J. Perry Center
- 0910-0920 NDU President Welcome / Bienvenida del Presidente de NDU**
LtGen Michael Plehn
USAF
- 0920-0930 WJPC Organizational Brief / Resumen organizacional del Centro Perry**
Dr. Scott Tollefson
Dean of Academic Affairs / Decano Académico
- 0930-1045 Climate Change Panel / Panel de cambio climático**
Erin Sikorsky
Director of the Center for Climate and Security
- Dr. Annalise Blum*
DOD Climate Office
- Moderator:**
Dr. Scott Tollefson
- 1045-1105 BREAK / DESCANSO**
- 1105-1205 Keynote Address / Discurso de apertura**
Dr. Hal Brands
JHU SAIS
- Moderator:**
Dr. Pat Paterson
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Monday Speaker Biographies

LTG (Ret.) Frederick S. Rudesheim

Retired US Army Lieutenant General Frederick S. “Rudy” Rudesheim was appointed Director of the William J. Perry Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies by the Office of the Secretary of Defense in February 2018.

Born and raised for 18 years in the Republic of Panama, Lieutenant General (ret.) Rudesheim was commissioned as a distinguished military graduate from the University of Texas, Austin in 1981, where he earned a Bachelor of Arts degree in Political Science. He holds Master’s degrees in International Relations from Troy University, in Strategic Studies from the US Army War College, and in Advanced Military Studies from the United States Army Command and General Staff College.

He served as the Commander of 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized) deploying to Operation Iraqi Freedom from April 2003 to March 2004. He later returned as Deputy Commanding General of the 1st Cavalry Division and Multi-National Division - Baghdad, Iraq, from February 2009 to January 2010. His most recent command was as the Commander for the United States Army - South at Fort Sam Houston, Texas.

His previous joint assignments include a tour with US Joint Forces - Korea; Director of Joint Capability Development at the US Joint Forces Command; and three tours with the Joint Staff: the first as a Division Chief and Deputy Director for the J5, the second as the Deputy Director for the J7, and most recently as the Vice Director of the Joint Staff. From January 2015 until his retirement, he served as US Security Coordinator for Israel and the Palestinian Authority, in Jerusalem.

Dr. Hal Brands

Hal Brands is the Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) and a Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA). He is also a columnist for *Bloomberg Opinion*. He is the author or editor of several books, including *American Grand Strategy in the Age of Trump* (2018), *Making the Unipolar Moment: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Rise of the Post-Cold War Order* (2016), *What Good is Grand Strategy? Power and Purpose in American Statecraft from Harry S. Truman to George W. Bush* (2014), *Latin America’s Cold War* (2010), *From Berlin to Baghdad: America’s Search for Purpose in the Post-Cold War World* (2008), and *The Power of the Past: History and Statecraft* (co-edited with Jeremi Suri, 2015). His newest book is *The Lessons of Tragedy: Statecraft and World Order*, co-authored with Charles Edel.

Hal served as Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Strategic Planning from 2015 to 2016, and has been a Council on Foreign Relations International Affairs Fellow. He has also consulted with a range of government offices and agencies in the intelligence and national security communities and served as lead writer for the Commission on the National Defense Strategy for the United States.

Hal received his BA from Stanford University (2005) and his PhD from Yale University (2009). He previously worked at Duke University's Sanford School of Public Policy and the Institute for Defense Analyses. He lives in Maryland with his wife and two children.

Dr. Annalise Blum

Dr. Annalise Blum is a hydrologist and environmental engineer who specializes in national and environmental security policy. She serves as the Senior Advisor for Climate to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities at the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD). In this role, Annalise leads efforts to integrate climate change considerations across DoD strategy and planning. She also co-leads Resource Competition, Environmental Security, and Stability (RECESS), a subject matter expert group to inform DoD strategic thinking on the national security impacts of climate and environmental change.

Over the last decade, Annalise has led multi-disciplinary research on water security, extreme events, and global environmental change in the United States, East Africa, South America, and Southeast Asia. Previously, she served as an American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) Science & Technology Policy Fellow in Stability and Humanitarian Affairs at DoD and as a lecturer in Environmental Sciences and Policy at Johns Hopkins University. Annalise has also worked at the National Academy of Sciences, the American Meteorological Society, the US Geological Survey, and the Harvard Kennedy School of Government.

Annalise holds a Ph.D. in environmental and water resources engineering from Tufts University, an M.S. in environmental sciences and engineering from UNC-Chapel Hill, and a B.S. in environmental engineering from Stanford University.

Erin Sikorsky

Erin Sikorsky is Director of the Center for Climate and Security (CCS), and the International Military Council on Climate and Security (IMCCS). Previously, she served as the Deputy Director of CCS. Prior to her service with the organization, Erin served as Deputy Director of the Strategic Futures Group on the National Intelligence Council (NIC) in the US, where she co-authored the quadrennial Global

Trends report and led the US intelligence community's environmental and climate security analysis. She is also the founding chair of the Climate Security Advisory Council, a Congressionally mandated group designed to facilitate coordination between the intelligence community and US government scientific agencies. Ms. Sikorsky worked in the US intelligence community for over a decade. Prior to joining the NIC, she led teams covering a range of issues related to the Middle East and Africa.

Ms. Sikorsky is an adjunct professor at George Mason University, a visiting fellow at University of Pennsylvania's Perry World House, and serves on the advisory board of the Smith College Center for Environment, Ecological Design and Sustainability. She is a frequent commentator in print, on radio, and on television. She has published articles in a range of outlets, including War on the Rocks, The Hill, Just Security, and The Cipher Brief. Ms. Sikorsky earned a Master of International Affairs at Columbia University, and a B.A. in government from Smith College.

Highlighted Readings for Monday

The Emerging Biden Doctrine: Democracy, Autocracy, and the Defining Clash of our Time

Hal Brands | *Foreign Affairs* | June 29, 2021

On his recent trip to Europe, President Joe Biden hammered home the defining theme of his foreign policy. The U.S.-Chinese rivalry, he said, is part of a larger “contest with autocrats” over “whether democracies can compete . . . in the rapidly changing twenty-first century.” It wasn't a rhetorical flourish. Biden has repeatedly argued the world has reached an “inflection point” that will determine whether this century marks another era of democratic dominance or an age of autocratic ascendancy. Tomorrow's historians, he has predicted, will be “doing their doctoral theses on the issue of who succeeded: autocracy or democracy?”

Biden hasn't always seen the world this way. In 2019, he mocked the suggestion that China was a serious competitor, let alone the leading edge of an epochal ideological challenge. But his claim that the central clash of our time is the contest between democratic and authoritarian systems of government appears genuine—and has profound implications for U.S. foreign policy and geopolitics.

For the Biden administration, the concept captures what is driving the United States' relations with its principal rivals and what is at stake. It links great-power competition to the revitalization of American democracy and the fight against transnational scourges, such as corruption and COVID-19. And it focuses the United States on a truly grand strategy of fortifying the democratic world against the most serious set of threats it has confronted in generations.

The question is whether the administration can now turn this vision into a reality. Biden has identified the defining strategic challenge of the twenty-first century, but the problems—both inherent and self-created—are already daunting.

A WORLD SAFE FOR AUTOCRACY

President Donald Trump may have turned Washington toward great-power competition, but Biden has put that issue within a larger strategic frame. Until the pandemic struck, Trump often seemed to see the U.S.-Chinese rivalry primarily as a fight over the terms of trade. By contrast, Biden views that competition as part of “a fundamental debate” between those who believe that “autocracy is the best way forward” and those who believe that “democracy will and must prevail.”

The community of democratic nations confronts three interrelated challenges. First is the threat from authoritarian powers—Russia and particularly China. These countries are contesting U.S. power around the world and menacing democratic nations from eastern Europe to the Taiwan Strait. Yet the challenge they pose is as much ideological as geopolitical. Different models of order at home produce different visions of order abroad: Russia and China want to weaken, fragment, and replace the existing international system because its foundational liberal principles are antithetical to their illiberal domestic practices. The danger, then, is that Moscow and Beijing will make the world safe for autocracy in ways that make it unsafe for democracy.

Russia is using cyberattacks and disinformation to knock democracies off balance and turn their citizens against one another, just as liberal societies have become increasingly tribal and polarized. China uses its market power to punish criticism—that is, free speech—in advanced democracies from Europe to Australia; provides the world’s autocrats with the tools and techniques of repression; and is rewriting the rules of international organizations to protect and even privilege authoritarianism. Most menacingly, Beijing is making generational outlays in technologies, such as 5G telecommunications and artificial intelligence, meant to spread China’s autocratic influence and propel it past its democratic rivals. The bottom line is that a world led by empowered, aggressive autocracies will be, as President Franklin Roosevelt warned, a “shabby and dangerous place” for those who value freedom.

The second threat comes from transnational problems that take on added gravity in a contest of systems. COVID-19 is not simply a once-in-a-century pandemic; it is a challenge to the idea that democracies can effectively respond to the most pressing perils its citizens face. Cross-border corruption is not just a threat to good governance; it is an evil that Moscow, Beijing, and other authoritarians exploit to expand their sway and weaken their rivals. The divide between great-power competition and transnational issues is artificial: democracies won’t win the former without addressing the latter.

The third threat is the decay of democracy from within. In recent years, the United States has seen the election of an unabashedly illiberal president and a violent effort to overturn a democratic election. Throughout the liberal world, antidemocratic sentiments and dissatisfaction with representative institutions have reached heights not seen since World War II. These trends are alarming in their own right; they also leave the United States and its allies more vulnerable to autocratic predation. This crisis of democratic governance at home is of a piece with the crisis of democratic influence abroad.

THE BIDEN DOCTRINE

This three-fold challenge suggests a three-fold response—elements of which can be seen in the Biden administration’s early moves. First, the United States must strengthen the cohesion and resilience of the democratic community against its autocratic rivals and make such democratic solidarity truly global, since so many aspects of the threat require a global response. Second, it must lead the world’s democracies in addressing transnational problems that no nation can solve on its own. And it must build a “position of strength” for global rivalry by reinvesting in its own competitiveness and demonstrating that democracies can still deliver for their citizens.

The Biden foreign policy has been centered on putting this sweeping concept of American strategy—rooted in the inescapable fact that the supremacy of democracy is more imperiled than at any time in generations—into operation. Whereas many of Trump’s worst international relationships were with the United States’ closest allies, Biden has prioritized repairing those alliances as shields in a global democratic phalanx. He has sought to smooth diplomatic and trade disputes with Europe to create a stronger united front against Russia and China and has worked with allies in Europe and the Indo-Pacific to signal that aggression against Taiwan could cost the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) dearly. An early summit of the Group of 7 produced common language on the Chinese threat and plans for an infrastructure program that will promote transparent, high-quality projects in the developing world—a democratic answer to Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative.

The administration has also fostered hubs of democratic cooperation on key global challenges. Under Biden, the Quad and the G-7 have announced plans to distribute nearly two billion COVID-19 vaccines to developing nations. The administration is preparing a multilateral push to counter corruption and the illicit financial flows that Russian President Vladimir Putin, among other autocrats, has so skillfully weaponized. Although Biden had earlier talked up a global “summit of democracies” to take on these and other issues, so far he has relied on smaller, existing groups that can deliver tangible progress now and perhaps set the stage for grander endeavors later.

Biden has identified the defining challenge of the century, but the problems are already daunting.

Biden has taken the same tack in the technology competition. For now, the administration has downgraded the idea of creating a D-10, T-12, or some other large, formal democratic coalition to counter autocratic influences on technology. Instead, it is working with select countries and groupings—South Korea on semiconductors and 5G and 6G technology, the EU on aligning technology and trade policy, Japan on ensuring an open global Internet, NATO on countering cyberattacks and disinformation—to build democratic cooperation from the ground up.

Meanwhile, the administration has been pushing back, often multilaterally, against the most egregious forms of authoritarian repression and predation. The president reportedly threatened Putin with grave consequences if Russian cyberattacks against critical infrastructure continue. Washington joined the EU in imposing sanctions on Belarus after the government of President Alexander Lukashenko forced down a plane carrying a wanted dissident—an example of the extraterritorial repression that Russia, China, and other authoritarians are using to hound their critics and entrench their rule. And Biden’s team worked with Canada, the United Kingdom, and the EU to sanction CCP officials involved in the horrifying repression in Xinjiang—thereby triggering a “Wolf Warrior” meltdown that blew up an investment agreement Beijing had signed with Brussels only months before.

At home, Biden has been pursuing investments in scientific research and development, digital and physical infrastructure, and other areas to improve competitiveness and address working- and middle-class alienation. His promise of a “foreign policy for the middle class” is meant to show that global engagement can pay for working families, and his push for a global minimum tax would, administration officials argue, help democracies invest more in their citizens. From Biden’s perspective, these measures represent down payments on the sort of domestic rejuvenation and reform that once helped the democracies win another contest of systems during the Cold War.

THE HARD PART

Yet just as the outlines of a strategy are coming into view, so are the challenges and shortcomings. Most obviously, Biden’s framing plays better with some audiences than with others. The strategy is premised on the idea that the United States can best check the authoritarian advance through deeper solidarity with established democracies. But hemming in Russian and Chinese power, whether militarily or diplomatically, will also require cooperation with imperfect or downright autocratic governments in countries from Poland and Turkey to Vietnam and the Philippines. This need not be a fatal problem: Washington made alliances with like-minded democracies the core of its Cold War strategy while also building productive, if transactional, relationships with quasi democracies and outright tyrannies. But it underscores that there is no one-size-fits-all approach to coalition building—and that principled strategies still require pragmatic compromises.

Even with core democratic allies, closing ranks could prove harder than the administration expects. Biden can quickly reap the gains that come from ending fratricidal trade wars or withholding praise from a Russian dictator. And with Europe especially, there is clear scope for cooperation on issues such as investment screening. Yet rallying even close democratic allies will still be a challenge. European exporters are banking on a post-pandemic recovery powered by Chinese purchases; there are persistent transatlantic divisions on privacy, data, and other technology issues. Getting joint statements of concern about potential Chinese aggression against Taiwan or economic coercion of Australia is comparatively easy; fashioning concrete multilateral responses will be more difficult. And moves to shore up the free world against one threat can weaken it against another: the Biden administration dropped its opposition to the Nord Stream 2 pipeline in hopes of bringing Berlin on board vis-à-vis Beijing, but in doing so, it allowed Moscow to increase its leverage over vulnerable democracies in eastern Europe.

Focusing on the ideological and technological struggle could also distract the administration from equally pressing military dangers. The United States could, after all, lose the contest of systems by failing to contain authoritarian aggressors and defend democratic outposts in eastern Europe and the western Pacific. A bipartisan commission on U.S. defense strategy warned in 2018 that the United States simply does not have the military power necessary to meet its commitments around the Eurasian periphery.

The Pentagon is facing a gaping window of vulnerability in the Taiwan Strait. Yet the administration has shown comparatively little urgency on the military front: its first Pentagon budget request is flat (in real terms) and shortchanges near-term measures to harden the United States' posture in the Pacific. Today's rivalries are about more than military power—but democratic values won't save the free world in a gunfight.

Finally, the connection between the foreign and domestic components of the strategy is not as seamless as the administration claims. In Biden's view, improving the economic fortunes of the middle class is insurance against a Trumpist resurrection and a way of strengthening the domestic foundations of U.S. diplomacy. Yet among the practical results have been a "Buy American" edict that looks like "America first" with Democratic characteristics and an underwhelming trade policy that, so far, has left many countries—particularly in Asia—wondering if the United States is really back. If Biden's strategy doesn't support an expansive, ambitious notion of prosperity, it won't do much for the cohesion and power of the free world.

Give Biden this much: he has correctly identified the overarching challenge of the era. Now comes the hard part. He must make his strategy real, and make it work.

Recommended Readings

“U.S. Role in the World: Background and Issues for Congress,” *Congressional Research Service*, August 26, 2020. Link: <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R44891.pdf>

Jonathan Bissell, “The Challenge of Sustaining US Influence in Latin America in the 21st Century,” *William J. Perry Center Occasional Paper*, April 2016. Link: <http://williamjperrycenter.org/sites/all/modules/pubdnt/pubdnt.php?fid=8>

Brands, Hal, “U.S. Bets Old Ideas in a New Package Can Deter China,” *Bloomberg*, December 11, 2019

Brands, Hal, *Democracy vs. Authoritarianism: How Ideology Shapes Great-Power Conflict, Survival*, October-November, 2018

Brands, Hal, “U.S. Grand Strategy in an Age of Nationalism: Fortress American and its Alternatives,” *Washington Quarterly*, Spring 2017: 73-93

Editorial Board, “The Coronavirus Pandemic May Mark a Decline in U.S. Leadership,” *Washington Post*, March 23, 2020.

Elbridge A. Colby and A. Wess Mitchell, “The Age of Great-Power Competition,” *Foreign Affairs*, January/February 2020.

Climate Change and International Responses Increasing Challenges to US National Security Through 2040 (National Intelligence Estimate)

https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/NIE_Climate_Change_and_National_Security.pdf

DOD Climate risk analysis

<https://media.defense.gov/2021/Oct/21/2002877353/-1/-1/0/DOD-CLIMATE-RISK-ANALYSIS-FINAL.PDF>

National Intelligence Council, “Global Trends 2040: A More Contested World,” *Office of the Director of National Intelligence*, March 2021

Kate Guy and Annalise Blum, “Climate Change is a Threat the Next Generation Cannot Face Alone,” *Just Security*, February 17, 2021

Annalise Blum, “A Network to Meet the Security Challenges of Environmental Stressors and Instability”, *American Geophysical Union*, December 2020

Adrienne Janetti and Maria Langan-Riekhof, “Expecting the unexpected: Four potential shocks in the Middle East and South Asia in 2017”, *Brookings*, February 23, 2017

Mowla, Wazim, “The Cycle of Risk: Impact of Climate Change on Security Challenges in the Caribbean” (2021). Research Publications. 46. https://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/jgi_research/46

Remarks by President Biden at the COP26 Leaders Statement. <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/11/01/remarks-by-president-biden-at-the-cop26-leaders-statement/>

DAY 2

Tuesday, 16 November 2021 / martes, 16 de noviembre 2021

US Foreign and Regional Policy

0900-0910 Daily Introduction / Introducción diaria

0910-1030 U.S. Foreign Policy / Política exterior de los EEUU

Dr. Daniel Drezner
Fletcher School of Diplomacy

Dr. Matthew Kroenig
Georgetown University

Moderator:

Dr. Pat Paterson

1030-1045 BREAK / DESCANSO

1045-1215 U.S. Regional Policy / Política regional de los EEUU

AMB Tom Shannon
*Former Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs and
Former United States Ambassador to Brazil*

Dr. Cynthia McClintock
George Washington University

Moderator:

Dr. Fabiana Perera

Tuesday Speaker Biographies

Dr. Daniel Drezner

Daniel W. Drezner is professor of international politics, a nonresident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, and a contributing editor at The Washington Post. Prior to joining The Fletcher School at Tufts University, he taught at the University of Chicago and the University of Colorado at Boulder. He has previously held positions with Civic Education Project, the RAND Corporation and the U.S. Department of the Treasury, and received fellowships from the German Marshall Fund of the United States, Council on Foreign Relations, and Harvard University.

Drezner has written five books, including “All Politics is Global” and “Theories of International Politics and Zombies,” and edited two others, including “Avoiding Trivia.” He has published articles in numerous scholarly journals as well as in The New York Times, Wall Street Journal, Politico, and Foreign Affairs, and has been a contributing editor for Foreign Policy and The National Interest.

He received his B.A. in political economy from Williams College and an M.A. in economics and Ph.D. in political science from Stanford University. His blog for Foreign Policy magazine was named by TIME as one of the 25 best blogs of 2012, and he currently writes the Spoiler Alerts blog for The Washington Post.

Dr. Matthew Kroenig

Matthew Kroenig is a Professor in the Department of Government and the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. A 2019 study in *Perspectives on Politics* ranked him as one of the top 25 most-cited political scientists of his generation.

Dr. Kroenig is the author or editor of seven books, including *The Return of Great Power Rivalry: Democracy versus Autocracy from the Ancient World to the US and China* (Oxford University Press, 2020), which was Amazon’s #1 New Release in International Relations. *The Logic of American Nuclear Strategy: Why Strategic Superiority Matters* (Oxford University Press, 2018) was selected by the US Air Force for its professional reading list and was translated into Chinese and Korean. *Exporting the Bomb: Technology Transfer and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons* (Cornell University Press, 2010) was awarded the International Studies Association Best Book Award, Honorable Mention.

His articles have appeared in many publications, including: *American Political Science Review*, *Annual Review of Political Science*, *Foreign Affairs*, *Foreign Policy*, *International Organization*, *Internation-*

al Security, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Journal of Peace Research, Journal of Strategic Studies, Politico, Security Studies, Strategic Studies Quarterly, The Atlantic, The New Republic, The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal, and the Washington Post, among others. He writes the bi-weekly “Its Debatable” column at Foreign Policy. Dr. Kroenig provides regular commentary for major media outlets, including on PBS Newshour, Fareed Zakaria GPS, CBS, BBC, CNN, Fox News, NPR All Things Considered, and C-SPAN.

Dr. Kroenig has served in several positions in the U.S. Department of Defense and the intelligence community in the Bush, Obama, and Trump administrations, including in the Strategy, Middle East, and Nuclear and Missile Defense offices in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the CIA’s Strategic Assessments Group. From 2017-2021, he was a Special Government Employee (SGE) and Senior Policy Adviser to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Capability/Nuclear and Missile Defense Policy. In this role, he provided advice on matters relating to the formulation, drafting, coordination, and implementation of nuclear deterrence policy and strategy in support of the 2018 US Nuclear Posture Review. He was a major contributor to formulating tailored deterrence strategies for China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran. In 2011, he developed strategic options for addressing Iran’s nuclear program. In 2005, he was the principal author of the first-ever, US-government-wide strategy for deterring terrorist networks. For this work, he received the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s Award for Outstanding Achievement. He is a featured character in *The New York Times* bestselling book, *Counterstrike: The Untold Story of America’s Secret Campaign against Al Qaeda*, by Eric Schmitt and Thom Shanker. He was as a national security adviser on the presidential campaigns of Mitt Romney (2012) and Marco Rubio (2016). He has testified before Congress and regularly consults with the White House, State Department, Pentagon, Congress, the intelligence community, and allied governments.

Dr. Kroenig is also the Director of the Global Strategy Initiative and Deputy Director of the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council. He has previously worked as the Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, and as a research fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Security at Harvard University, and the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University.

He is a life member of the Council on Foreign Relations and holds an MA and PhD in political science from the University of California at Berkeley. He lives with his wife and children in Georgetown.

Dr. Cynthia McClintock

Cynthia McClintock is Professor of Political Science and International Affairs at George Washington University and Director of GWU’s Latin American and Hemispheric Studies Program. She holds the

B.A. degree from Harvard University and the Ph.D. from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dr. McClintock was President of the Latin American Studies Association in 1994-95. Also, she was a member of the Council of the American Political Science Association in 1998-2000, and served as the Chair of its Comparative Democratization Section in 2003-05.

During 2006-2007, Prof. McClintock was a Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. Based on her research at the Center, she is writing a book on the implications for democracy of runoff versus plurality rules for the election of the president in Latin America.

Prof. McClintock has received fellowships from the U.S. Institute of Peace, Fulbright, and the Social Science Research Council as well as from the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. She has testified before the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs of the U.S. House of Representatives and has appeared on a variety of television and radio programs, including the “News Hour with Jim Lehrer,” CNN International, CNN Spanish, National Public Radio, and the Diane Rehm Show.

AMB Thomas A. Shannon

Thomas A. Shannon, Jr., was confirmed as Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs on February 12, 2016. Previously Ambassador Shannon served as Counselor of the Department. Ambassador Shannon had served briefly as Senior Advisor to the Secretary following his return in September from Brazil, where he served as United States Ambassador for nearly four years. He is a Career Ambassador in the Senior Foreign Service of the United States. Ambassador Shannon is only the seventh Foreign Service Officer to hold the position of Counselor since World War II, and the first in 32 years.

Prior to his tenure in Brazil, Ambassador Shannon served as Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs from 2005 to 2009. He served as Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Western Hemisphere Affairs at the National Security Council from 2003-2005. From 2002 to 2003, he was Deputy Assistant Secretary of Western Hemisphere Affairs at the Department of State, where he was Director of Andean Affairs from 2001 to 2002. He was U.S. Deputy Permanent Representative to the Organization of American States (OAS), with the rank of Ambassador, from 2000 to 2001. Ambassador Shannon also served as Director of Inter-American Affairs at the National Security Council from 1999 to 2000, as Political Counselor at the U.S. Embassy in Caracas, Venezuela, from 1996 to 1999, and as Regional Labor Attaché at the U.S. Consulate General in Johannesburg, South Africa, from 1992 to 1996.

During his thirty year career as a Foreign Service officer, Ambassador Shannon also served as Special Assistant to the Ambassador at the U.S. Embassy in Brasilia, Brazil from 1989 to 1992, as Country Of-

ficer for Cameroon, Gabon, and Sao Tome and Principe from 1987 to 1989, and as a Consular/Political Rotational Officer at the U.S. Embassy in Guatemala City, Guatemala, from 1984 to 1986.

Ambassador Shannon graduated with high honors from the College of William and Mary in 1980, having studied government and philosophy. He is a member of Phi Beta Kappa. He then studied at Oxford University, where he received a M. Phil in Politics in 1982, and a DPhil in Politics in 1983. He speaks Spanish and Portuguese.

Highlighted Readings for Tuesday

The coming sea change in American foreign policy: Some initial predictions about Biden's approach to the world

Dr. Daniel Drezner | *The Washington Post* / November 23, 2020

One of the roiling 2020 debates among the U.S. foreign policy community is whether, in a post-Trump world, it is possible to return to the pre-Trump status quo. For many, the desire for a return to normalcy is powerful. For some critics, the pre-2016 liberal international order was never great and necessitates far more reform than restoration. For other critics (clears throat loudly), the very existence of President Trump means that mainstream liberal internationalism is probably not sustainable.

These are discussions well worth having. Projecting the likelihood of the Joe Biden administration conducting a successful foreign policy is an important question. That said, it's still November 2020. Biden will not be the president for another eight-plus weeks. The Age of Trump is not a patient one, but it might be good to give the new team a month or two before writing up their postmortems.

This does not mean that we cannot make any predictions, however. We know Biden will be the president, and Kamala D. Harris will be the vice president. Biden is sufficiently conventional that political scientists do not need to gin up individual-level explanations for their behavior.

We further know from the Biden-Harris transition team who will be occupying the key positions in the foreign policy team: Antony Blinken as secretary of state, Jake Sullivan as national security adviser, Avril Haines as director of national intelligence, Linda Thomas-Greenfield as ambassador to the United Nations, and John F. Kerry as presidential envoy for climate change.

So, based on the political science literature, what can we expect from the incoming Biden administration? Here are three predictions:

1. Minimal freelancing. As noted previously here at Spoiler Alerts, Biden is the most experienced person to be elected president since George H.W. Bush. This is particularly true on foreign policy. Biden was vice president for eight years and chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee for even longer. He is genuinely interested and knowledgeable about foreign policy.

As my colleague Elizabeth Saunders noted in her outstanding 2017 International Organization paper, experienced subordinates are far more likely to freelance when the president is inexperienced because they know they are more likely to get away with it. This was why the same people were perceived as acting competently under Bush 41 and less so under Bush 43. This was also why so many Trump subordinates clashed with each other and with the president on foreign policy matters.

Saunders's model suggests that Biden's experience means freelancing will be at a minimum with the incoming administration. I am delighted to see that she codes this in a similar way. So, expect less talk from envoys of playing shell games with the president.

2. The foreign policy machine will run better. Trump came into the presidency convinced he could bluff, bully and feint his way through foreign affairs. This turned out not to be true, leading to some loud failures. A related problem was that Trump's subordinates came to be viewed as not representing the president. Everyone lived in fear of a presidential tweet that would disrupt whatever understandings had previously been reached. Over time, this meant foreign interlocutors discounted the word of U.S. diplomats and national security officials.

If nothing else, Biden is highly unlikely to countermand anything Blinken says with a tweet. All of Biden's foreign policy picks go back a long way with each other and with Biden. Furthermore, most of them have held policy positions outside of where they are about to be appointed; Sullivan was director of policy planning at State, and Blinken spent considerable time at the National Security Council before becoming deputy secretary of state.

For foreign interlocutors, the message is a simple one. Biden's subordinates and surrogates will be viewed as an extension of the president and not as the adult in the room who might be fired in the next 24 hours

3. Biden will make foreign policy boring again. As Graeme Wood notes in the Atlantic, Biden's choices to date are "the equivalent of a warm cup of Ovaltine with a melatonin chaser." He did not mean this as an insult, but rather as an acknowledgment that "they were hypercompetent public servants who tended not to make hilarious, unforced errors."

Wood also notes that this does not guarantee success by any means: The Obama administration did not have an unblemished foreign policy record. Still, this is going to be such a welcome relief. The world is uncertain enough without having to endure drama queens in one's life, and the Trump administration was nothing but drama queens. I am looking forward to getting off a plane, turning on my phone and not mentally girding myself for the insane news cycles missed in midair. If the Trump administration's foreign policy team resembled a loud, vulgar reality show, the Biden team sounds like that soothing music they pump into day spas. And I, for one, am ready for less drama in my life and work.

Review of Kroenig's book *The Return of Great Power Rivalry*

John Ikenberry | *Foreign Affairs* / May/June 2020

Alexis de Tocqueville famously argued that democracies were “decidedly inferior” to autocratic states in the conduct of foreign affairs. Other thinkers, including Herodotus, Machiavelli, Montesquieu, and some modern liberal theorists, have insisted that, on the contrary, democracies have an advantage over nondemocracies. In this timely return to an old debate, Kroenig makes the case that democratic states tend to “do better” than other types of states in great-power rivalries. Democracies have greater capacities for generating long-term economic growth, borrowing capital, building alliances, making international agreements, and sustaining stable and legitimate rule. Kroenig bundles these familiar arguments together and sets out on a fast-paced historical journey through the classic cases of competition between democratic great powers and autocratic ones: from Athens and Sparta, to medieval Venice and its rivals, to the United Kingdom and Germany in the twentieth century, and finally to the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Kroenig does not claim that democracies always prevail in war or succeed in building hegemony, but he does insist that democratic states can “punch above their weight.” The value of the book lies in framing an important question for today: In the United States' growing competition with China, will its democracy be an advantage or a hindrance?

Recommended Reading

National Security Council, Western Hemisphere Strategic Framework, August 2020.

<https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/Western-Hemisphere-Strategic-Framework.pdf>

U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America: Policy Issues for Congress, *Congressional Research Service*, November 12, 2019.

Central America Regional Security Initiative: Background and Policy Issues for Congress,” *Congressional Research Service*, December 17, 2015.

“Human Smuggling from Central America to the U.S.” *Rand Corporation*, May 2019.

William A. Kandel, “Unaccompanied Alien Children: An Overview,” *Congressional Research Service*, October 9, 2019.

Recent Migration to the United States from Central America: Frequently Asked Questions, *Congressional Research Service*, January 29, 2019.

Celina Realuyo, “The Intent and Impact of US Sanctions on Cuba and Venezuela,” William J. Perry Center Regional Insight, October 2019. Link (English): <http://williamjperrycenter.org/sites/all/modules/pubdlcnt/pubdlcnt.php?fid=23> Link (Spanish): <http://williamjperrycenter.org/sites/all/modules/pubdlcnt/pubdlcnt.php?fid=336>

Anthony Faiola, Lindzi Wessel, and Shibani Mahtani, “Coronavirus Chills Protests from Chile to Hong Kong to Iraq, Forcing Activists to Innovate,” *Washington Post*, April 4, 2020.

Department of State and USAID, Joint Strategic Plan FY 2018-2022

<https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/Joint-Strategic-Plan-FY-2018-2022.pdf>

Joint Regional Strategy, Western Hemisphere (03 January 2019)

https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/JRS_WHA-LAC_UNCLASS-508.pdf

Department of State Organization Chart – July 2019

<https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/DOS-Org-Chart-July-2019508.pdf>

“U.S. Role in the World: Background and Issues for Congress,” *Congressional Research Service*, August 26, 2020. Link: <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R44891.pdf>

Traub, James, “The Biden Doctrine Exists Already. Here’s an Inside Preview,” *Foreign Policy*, August 20, 2020.

Paterson, Patrick, *Orígenes de la Política Exterior de EEUU: 241 Años de la Política Exterior de los Estados Unidos*, Editorial Académica Española, 2018. Link: <http://williamjperrycenter.org/sites/all/modules/pubdclnt/pubdclnt.php?fid=5>

Sharma, Ruchir, “The Comeback Nation, U.S. Economic Supremacy Has Repeatedly Proved Declinists Wrong,” *Foreign Affairs*, March 31, 2020.

Carafano, James, “Saving the World’s International Organizations,” *Heritage Foundation*, March 20, 2020.

VornDick, Wilson, “America Must Have a Grander Strategy for China,” *National Interest*, March 16, 2020.

Walt, Stephen N., “Why is the United States So Bad at Foreign Policy?” *Foreign Policy*, January 13, 2020.

DAY 3

Wednesday, 17 November 2021 / miércoles, 17 de noviembre 2021

US Defense and Military Strategy

0900-0910 Daily Introduction / Introducción diaria

0910-1030 U.S. Military Strategy / Estrategia militar de los EEUU

Dr. Richard H. Kohn

Chairman, Curriculum in Peace, War, and Defense and Professor of History,
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill; Executive Secretary,
Triangle Institute for Security Studies.

Dr. Kori Schake

American Enterprise Institute

Moderator:

Dr. David Spencer

1030-1045 BREAK / DESCANSO

1045-1215 U.S. Security/Defense Perspectives in Latin America / Perspectivas de seguridad y defensa en América Latina

OSD WHA Panelist:

Mr. Daniel P. Erikson

DASD WHA

U.S. Southern Command Panelist:

LtGen Andrew A. Croft

MDC U.S. Southern Command

U.S. Northern Command Panelist:

To be Announced

Moderator:

LTG (Ret.) Frederick S. Rudesheim



Wednesday Speaker Biographies

Dr. Richard H. Kohn

Dr. Richard H. Kohn is Professor of History and of Peace, War, and Defense at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. He was Omar N. Bradley Professor of Strategic Leadership at the U.S. Army War College and Dickinson College, Carlisle, Pennsylvania during the 2006-2007 academic year. A specialist in American military history and civil-military relations, Dr. Kohn has written and edited numerous books including (with Peter D. Feaver), *Soldiers and Civilians: The Civil-Military Gap and American National Security* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001) and *Eagle and Sword: The Federalists and the Creation of the Military Establishment in America, 1783-1802* (New York: The Free Press, 1985). His recent publications have focused on civilian control of the military including “The Erosion of Civilian Control of the Military in the United States Today,” which won the 2002 Edward S. Miller History Prize of the Naval War College Review. He is presently working on a study of presidential war leadership in American history.

Dr. Kori Schake

Kori Schake is a senior fellow and the director of foreign and defense policy studies at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI).

Before joining AEI, Dr. Schake was the deputy director-general of the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London. She has had a distinguished career in government, working at the US State Department, the US Department of Defense, and the National Security Council at the White House. She has also taught at Stanford, West Point, Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies, National Defense University, and the University of Maryland.

Dr. Schake is the author of five books, among them “America vs the West: Can the Liberal World Order Be Preserved?” (Penguin Random House Australia, Lowy Institute, 2018); “Safe Passage: The Transition from British to American Hegemony” (Harvard University Press, 2017); “State of Disrepair: Fixing the Culture and Practices of the State Department” (Hoover Institution Press, 2012); and “Managing American Hegemony: Essays on Power in a Time of Dominance” (Hoover Institution Press, 2009).

She is also the coeditor, along with former Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis, of “Warriors & Citizens: American Views of Our Military” (Hoover Institution Press, 2016).

Dr. Schake has been widely published in policy journals and the popular press, including in CNN.com,

Foreign Affairs, Politico, The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal, and The Washington Post. She is a contributing writer at The Atlantic and War on the Rocks.

Dr. Schake has a PhD and MA in government and politics from the University of Maryland, as well as an MPM from the University of Maryland School of Public Policy. Her BA in international relations is from Stanford University.

Mr. Daniel P. Erikson

Daniel P. Erikson is the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Western Hemisphere at the U.S. Department of Defense. In this capacity, he serves in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and is responsible for U.S. defense and security policy for the thirty-four nation region that encompasses Canada, Mexico, Central America, the Caribbean, and South America.

Mr. Erikson served as the Western Hemisphere policy lead for the Biden-Harris Transition. He previously served in the White House as special advisor to then-Vice President Joe Biden, where he covered foreign affairs and national security issues in the Americas. Prior to the White House, he served in the U.S. Department of State as senior advisor for Congressional and Intergovernmental Affairs and senior advisor for Western Hemisphere Affairs. In 2017, he received the State Department's Superior Honor Award for his diplomatic contributions to U.S.-Latin American relations, including the advancement of bipartisan policies to support security and development in Central America and Colombia.

In addition to his U.S. government experience, Mr. Erikson has held senior positions in the private sector, think-tanks, and academia. He has published widely on a range of topics in international and Latin American and Caribbean affairs and testified before the U.S. Congress. Mr. Erikson earned his Masters in Public Policy at the Harvard Kennedy School and a B.A. in International Relations from Brown University. He was a Fulbright Scholar in Mexico and is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations. He lives with his wife and two daughters in Washington, D.C.

LtGen Andrew A. Croft

Lieutenant General Andrew A. Croft is the Military Deputy Commander, United States Southern Command, Doral, Florida. U.S. Southern Command is responsible for all Department of Defense security cooperation in the 45 nations and territories of Central and South America and the Caribbean Sea, an area of 16 million square miles. Southern Command deters aggression, defeats threats, rapidly responds to crises, and builds regional capacity, working with our allies, partner nations, and U.S. government (USG) team members to enhance security and defend the U.S. homeland and our national interests.

General Croft received his commission through ROTC at the University of California, Los Angeles, in 1988. Following pilot training at Columbus Air Force Base, Mississippi, he served in six flying assignments in the F-15C and flew in support of operations Southern Watch and Northern Watch. He is a graduate of the U.S. Air Force Weapons School and served as commander of the 12th Air Forces (Air Forces Southern) at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, A.Z. and commander of 49th Wing at Holloman Air Force Base, N.M. He is a command pilot with more than 3,200 flying hours.

Highlighted Readings for Wednesday

The Line Held: Civil-Military Relations in the Trump Administration

Dr. Kori Schake | *Strategic Studies Quarterly* | Summer 2021

Abstract

Despite legitimate concern about civil-military relations during the Trump presidency—and considerable efforts by the president to subvert US law and the norms of civil-military relations—this important guardrail in American public life has withstood the pressure. Deference to civilian authority went unchallenged in relief of commanders and execution of policy. Where law and norms were broached, such as appointing a recently retired officer as defense secretary, Congress and the subsequent administration are equally liable. Military and veteran leaders have made mistakes, especially during the Black Lives Matter protests, but their acknowledgement and correction have strengthened the crucial prohibition on partisan political activity. President Trump did little structural damage to civil-military relations; the question remains whether his efforts have further politicized public attitudes about our military. Accepting polarization would be terrible for our military, affecting recruiting, unit cohesion, and war-fighting competence. We will have a worse military and be less secure if that comes to pass.

Full text: https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/SSQ/documents/Volume-15_Issue-2/Schake.pdf

Civil-Military Relations in the United States: What Senior Leaders Need to Know (and Usually Don't)

Dr. Richard H. Kohn and Peter Feaver | *Strategic Studies Quarterly* | Summer 2021

Abstract

Most flag and general military officers participate in civil-military relations (CMR) daily whether or not they realize it. Yet while these leaders recognize and support the principle of civilian control, they have thought little over time about how it works or the difficulties involved, much less the larger framework

of civil-military relations. Likewise, civilian leaders in the national security establishment, whether career civil servants or political appointees, contribute—for good or for ill—to American civil military relations. They seem to think about CMR even less. This article analyzes the two broad categories of interaction that compose CMR using several discrete topics within each area. The article highlights the paradox in CMR and the best practices that previous generations of leaders experienced and learned in navigating CMR issues successfully

Full text: https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/SSQ/documents/Volume-15_Issue-2/Feaver.pdf

Recommended Reading

National Security Strategy (March 2021)

<https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/NSC-1v2.pdf>

National Defense Strategy, Office of the Secretary of Defense (2018)

<https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf>

National Military Strategy, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (2018)

https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Publications/UNCLASS_2018_National_Military_Strategy_Description.pdf

Dan Coats, “Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community,” January 29, 2019.

Link: <https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/2019-ATA-SFR---SSCI.pdf>

Defense Primer: The United States Space Force,” *Congressional Research Service*, April 6, 2020.

U.S. Sanctions on Russia, *Congressional Research Service*, January 17, 2020.

Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States (Joint Pub 1), 20 March 2013. Link: https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp1_ch1.pdf

“General and Flag Officers in the U.S. Armed Forces: Background and Considerations for Congress,” *Congressional Research Service*, February 1, 2019.

Pettyjohn, Stacie and Becca Wesser, Why the Pentagon Should Abandon ‘Strategic Competition’<https://www.cnas.org/publications/commentary/why-the-pentagon-should-abandon-strategic-competition>

Mead, Walter Russell, “Beijing Escalates the New Cold War,” *Wall Street Journal*, March 18, 2020.

Rogan, Tom, “Why China Is a Bigger Threat Than the Soviet Union,” *Washington Examiner*, January 30, 2020.

United States Southern Command Strategy “Enduring Promise for the Americas,” 08 May 2019.

Lin:https://www.southcom.mil/Portals/7/Documents/SOUTHCOM_Strategy_2019.pdf?ver=2019-05-15-131647-353

Admiral Craig S. Faller, USN, Commander, United States Southern Command, Testimony to U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee, 30 Jan 2020. Link: https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/download/faller_01-30-20

Statement of General Glen VanHerck, Commander of North American Aerospace Defense Command and United States Northern Command, before the Senate Armed Services Committee, March 16, 2021. Link:<https://www.northcom.mil/Newsroom/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/2541921/norad-usnorthcom-commanders-senate-armed-services-committee-statement/>

William Knight, “Homeland Security Roles and Missions for US Northern Command,” *Congressional Research Service*, 03 June 2008.

Andrew Feickert, “The Unified Command Plan and Combatant Commands: Background and Issues for Congress,” *Congressional Research Service*, January 3, 2013

“Mexico: Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking Organizations,” *Congressional Research Service*, July 28, 2020.

Clare Ribando Seelke, “Gangs in Central America,” *Congressional Research Service*, August 29, 2016

“Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Issues in the 116th Congress,” *Congressional Research Service*, September 3, 2020.

Chloe Gilroy, “Great Power Competition and Counternarcotics in the Western Hemisphere,” *William J. Perry Center Occasional Paper*, September 2020. Link: <http://williamjperrycenter.org/sites/all/modules/pubdlcnt/pubdlcnt.php?fid=825>

Celina Realuyo, “The Intent and Impact of US Sanctions on Cuba and Venezuela,” *William J. Perry Center Regional Insight*, October 2019.

Douglas Farah and Caitlyn Yates, “Maduro’s Last Stand: Venezuela’s Survival Through the Bolivarian Joint Criminal Enterprise,” IBI Consultants, May 2019.

Fabiana Perera and Ana Saavedra, “Women, Peace, and Security,” *William J. Perry Center Regional Insight*, February 2019. Link: <http://williamjperrycenter.org/sites/all/modules/pubdlcnt/pubdlcnt.php?fid=24>

Celina Realuyo, “The Evolving Role of the Security Forces to Counter Transnational Organized Crime in the Americas,” *William J. Perry Center Regional Insight*, March 2018.

Link (English): <http://williamjperrycenter.org/sites/all/modules/pubdlcnt/pubdlcnt.php?fid=26>

Pat Paterson and Katy Robinson, “Measuring Success in the War on Drugs,” *William J. Perry Center Occasional Paper*, July 2014.

Link: <http://williamjperrycenter.org/sites/all/modules/pubdlcnt/pubdlcnt.php?fid=12>

DAY 4

Thursday, 18 November 2021 / jueves, 18 de noviembre 2021

Corruption and Foreign Assistance

0900-0910 Daily Introduction / Introducción diaria

**0910-1030 U.S. Perspective on Corruption
/ Perspectiva estadounidense sobre la corrupción**

Dr. Kurt Weyland
University of Texas, Austin

Dr. Louise Shelley
George Mason University

Moderator:
Dr. Bill Godnick

1030-1045 BREAK / DESCANSO

1045-1100 Perry Center Outreach Brief / Informe de alcance del Centro Perry

**1100-1215 Foreign Aid and Security Assistance
/ Ayuda extranjera y asistencia para la seguridad**

LTG (Ret.) David Barno
JHU SAIS

Dr. Paul Angelo
CFR

Moderator:
Dr. Pat Paterson

Thursday Speaker Biographies

Dr. Kurt Weyland

Professor Weyland's research interests focus on democratization and authoritarian rule, on social policy and policy diffusion, and on populism in Latin America and Europe. He has drawn on a range of theoretical and methodological approaches, including insights from cognitive psychology, and has done extensive field research in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Peru, and Venezuela. After receiving a Staatsexamen from Johannes-Gutenberg Universitat Mainz in 1984, a M.A. from UT in 1986, and a Ph.D. from Stanford University in 1991, he taught for ten years at Vanderbilt University and joined UT in 2001. He has received research support from the SSRC and NEH and was a fellow at the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington, DC, in 1999/2000 and at the Kellogg Institute, University of Notre Dame, in 2004/05. From 2001 to 2004, he served as Associate Editor of the *Latin American Research Review*.

He is the author of *Democracy without Equity: Failures of Reform in Brazil* (University of Pittsburgh Press, 1996), *The Politics of Market Reform in Fragile Democracies: Argentina, Brazil, Peru, and Venezuela* (Princeton University Press, 2002), *Bounded Rationality and Policy Diffusion: Social Sector Reform in Latin America* (Princeton University Press, 2007), several book chapters, and many articles in journals such as *World Politics*, *Comparative Politics*, *Comparative Political Studies*, *Latin American Research Review*, *International Studies Quarterly*, *Journal of Democracy*, *Foreign Affairs*, and *Political Research Quarterly*. He has also (co-)edited two volumes, namely *Learning from Foreign Models in Latin American Policy Reform* (Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2004) and, together with Wendy Hunter and Raul Madrid, *Leftist Governments in Latin America: Successes and Shortcomings* (Cambridge University Press, 2010). His latest book, *Making Waves: Democratic Contention in Europe and Latin America since the Revolutions of 1848*, was published by Cambridge University Press in 2014.

Dr. Louise Shelley

Dr. Louise Shelley is the Omer L. and Nancy Hirst Endowed Chair and a University Professor at George Mason University. She is in the Schar School of Policy and Government and directs the Terrorism, Transnational Crime and Corruption Center (TraCCC) that she founded. She is a leading expert on the relationship among terrorism, organized crime and corruption as well as human trafficking, transnational crime and terrorism with a particular focus on the former Soviet Union. She also specializes in illicit financial flows and money laundering. She was an inaugural Andrew Carnegie Fellow. Her newest book written while on the Carnegie Corporation and Rockefeller Foundation Bellagio Fellowship, *Dark Commerce: How a New Illicit Economy is Threatening our Future, on illicit trade, the new technology and sustainability* was published with Princeton University Press in November 2018.

Dr. Shelley received her undergraduate degree cum laude from Cornell University in Penology and Russian literature. She holds an M.A. in Criminology from the University of Pennsylvania. She studied at the Law Faculty of Moscow State University on IREX and Fulbright Fellowships and holds a Ph.D. in Sociology from the University of Pennsylvania. She held a Fulbright and researched and taught on crime issues in Mexico. She has also taught on transnational crime in Italy. She is the recipient of the Guggenheim, NEH, IREX, Kennan Institute, and Fulbright Fellowships and received a MacArthur Grant to establish the Russian Organized Crime Study Centers and recently completed a MacArthur grant studying non-state actors and nuclear proliferation. In 1992, she received the Scholar-Teacher prize of American University, the top academic award of the university.

From 1995-2014, Dr. Shelley ran programs in Russia, Ukraine and Georgia with leading specialists on the problems of organized crime and corruption. She has also been the principal investigator of large-scale projects on money laundering from Russia, Ukraine and Georgia and of training of law enforcement persons on the issue of trafficking in persons as well as wildlife trafficking. She has testified before the House Committee on International Relations Committee, the Helsinki Commission, the House Banking Committee, the House Financial Services Committee, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the Task Force on Terrorist Financing on transnational crime, human trafficking and the links between transnational crime, financial crime and terrorism. Professor Shelley served on the Global Agenda Council on Illicit Trade and Organized Crime of the World Economic Forum (WEF) and was the first co-chair of its Council on Organized Crime. Professor Shelley is a life member of the Council on Foreign Relations. She has spoken at various international fora and at many universities both in the United States and abroad on transnational crime, terrorism, human trafficking, illicit trade and corruption. Additionally, she often appears on television and radio, including appearances on CNN, NPR's Marketplace and Takeaway, PBS, A&E, the History Channel, C-span, Tavis Smiley, Kojo Nnamdi and 60 Minutes as well as in the European media such as BBC, Der Spiegel, Die Zeit, Die Welt.

LTG David Barno, U.S. Army (retired)

Lieutenant General David W. Barno, USA (Ret.) is a Visiting Professor of Strategic Studies and Senior Fellow at the Merrill Center of the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). He is also a Contributing Editor and Columnist for War on the Rocks, and an Adjunct Research Staff Member at the Institute for Defense Analyses.

General Barno completed a thirty-year active duty Army career where he commanded at every level, serving as an infantry officer, Ranger and paratrooper. He completed three tours in special operations forces, serving with Army Ranger battalions in combat during both the Panama and Grenada invasions. In 2003, he was selected to establish a new three-star operational headquarters in Kabul, Afghanistan and take command of the 20,000 U.S. and coalition forces in Operation Enduring Freedom. For nineteen

months as the senior American commander, Barno was responsible for overall coalition military leadership of the war in Afghanistan, implementing a new counterinsurgency strategy in close partnership with the U.S. embassy and coalition allies.

Following his military career, Barno served for four years as the Director of the Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies at the National Defense University. Concurrently, he was the Chairman of the Advisory Committee to the Secretary of Veterans Affairs on Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom Veterans and Families from 2007-2009. Following his time at NDU, he spent nearly five years as a Senior Fellow and later Co-Director of the Responsible Defense Program at the Center for a New American Security, a national security think tank based in Washington, D.C. He also later served as a Non-Resident Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council.

General Barno currently serves on the Secretary of Defense's Reserve Forces Policy Board and is a member of the U.S. Army War College Board of Visitors. He is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and the International Institute of Strategic Studies. Prior to his present academic position, he was a Distinguished Practitioner-in-Residence at American University's School of International Service where he taught graduate and undergraduate programs. He speaks and writes frequently on national security policy, civil-military issues, the changing character of conflict, and leader development. Since leaving military service, he has published extensively and testified before Congress over a dozen times.

A graduate of the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, General Barno earned his master's degree in National Security Studies from Georgetown University. He is a graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College and the U.S. Army War College. He has received numerous awards for his military and public service.

Dr. Paul Angelo

Paul J. Angelo is a fellow for Latin America Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). His work focuses on U.S.-Latin American relations, transnational crime, violent actors, military and police reform, and immigration. A former active-duty naval officer, Angelo has extensive experience in military and government service.

Angelo was formerly an International Affairs Fellow at CFR, and in this capacity, he represented the U.S. Department of State as a political officer at the U.S. Embassy in Tegucigalpa, Honduras, where he managed the ambassador's security and justice portfolio. In the Political Section, he provided technical assistance to the Honduran police reform commission; supported strategy development and agenda-setting for Afro-descendent, indigenous, and LGBTQ networks to improve civic engagement; and led policy and legal analysis on violence, crime, and migration trends. His previous service in the Navy includ-

ed tours in a United Kingdom-based NATO position, on board a destroyer deployed to the Asia-Pacific region, and as an instructor at the U.S. Naval Academy, where he taught Spanish and Latin American politics courses.

During his naval career, Angelo deployed to Colombia on three occasions over the course of more than a decade. During his longest mission in Colombia, he served as the U.S. Embassy's principal liaison to the Colombian military and police in the highly conflictive Pacific coast. He was directly responsible for the planning of inter-agency missions focused on improving local governance, rule of law, and security in support of Plan Colombia, and he spearheaded the coordination and implementation of the Embassy's largest bilateral humanitarian mission in 2011.

Angelo holds a BS in political science (with honors) from the U.S. Naval Academy, where he was awarded the Harry S. Truman Scholarship, an MPhil in Latin American studies (with distinction) from the University of Oxford, where he studied as a Rhodes Scholar, and a PhD in politics from University College London. Angelo's written commentary has appeared in *Foreign Affairs*, *Foreign Policy*, *The New York Times*, *The Washington Post*, *The Miami Herald*, *The Hill*, and *Survival: Global Politics and Strategy*.

Highlighted Readings for Thursday

The Politics of Corruption in Latin America

Dr. Kurt Weyland | *Journal of Democracy* | April 1998

There is a widespread impression that corruption has been on the rise in Latin America over the past 20 years. Certainly, bribery is not new to the region, but massive graft seems to have proliferated, as suggested by scandals in Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Venezuela, and other countries. Assuming that the perception of increased corruption reflects a real change, and is not due merely to better reporting and closer scrutiny by a more vigilant public, what are the main reasons behind this increase? Current explanations tend to stress heightened opportunities for extracting bribes more than incentives for doing so. As regards the former, many scholars have pointed to growing state interventionism, which gives bureaucrats and politicians broad discretion over temptingly vast resources.¹ Other scholars, by contrast, have pointed to the recent wave of neoliberal reforms, during which bureaucrats and politicians disposed of huge portions of public property, often with limited transparency.² While these factors were at work in some cases, they do not provide a sufficient explanation for the recent rise of corruption.

¹ See Daniel Kaufmann, "Corruption: The Facts," *Foreign Policy* 107 (Summer 1997): 119.

² Luigi Manzetti and Charles Blake, "Market Reforms and Corruption in Latin America," *Review of International Political Economy* 3 (Winter 1996): 671–82.

As regards increased incentives for corruption, a prime suspect is the wave of democratization that has swept across Latin America over the last 25 years. By dispersing power and requiring the consent of several institutions in decision making, the return of democracy has extended the range of actors who can demand bribes. But democratization can hardly account for the rise of corruption in authoritarian Mexico or in [End Page 108] a long-established democracy like Venezuela. Moreover, in principle, democratization should enhance the transparency of policy making and the accountability of politicians and bureaucrats, thereby limiting the spread of corruption.

My own explanation therefore emphasizes an additional factor—the rise of politicians who appeal to “the masses” via television. While ever more politicians use such appeals as one of their campaign tactics, mobilization of the previously unorganized has provided crucial bases of support for current or recent “neopopulist” leaders such as Argentina’s Carlos Menem, Brazil’s Fernando Collor de Mello, and Peru’s Alan García. Over the past 15 years, such personalistic leaders have sought to bypass established political parties and interest groups in order to reach “the people” through direct, most often televised, appeals aimed at building up a loyal following from scratch. Because its methods are costly, the new media-based politics has given ambitious politicians much higher incentives to resort to corruption.

In focusing on the rise of neopopulism, which has not received sufficient attention from analysts of corruption, I do not mean to deny that corruption can result from a variety of causes or combinations of causes. For instance, expanding state interventionism underlay the explosion of bribery in Mexico under President José López Portillo, while the neoliberal reduction of such interventionism offered huge opportunities for graft under his successor Carlos Salinas de Gortari. The drug trade has had a devastating impact on Colombia, Mexico, and (to a lesser extent) Peru, but has played a smaller role in Argentina, Brazil, and Venezuela. There are many sources of corruption, but the role of neopopulism is an important piece of this complicated puzzle.

Corruption may be defined as the provision of material benefits to politicians and public officials in exchange for illicit influence over their decisions. The corruptor uses private benefits to induce a public decision maker to bend or break formal rules of procedure in order to confer on the corruptor special favors in the adjudication of rights or the allocation of resources. Although it may be tolerated by a country’s citizens, corruption is, by definition, illegal. It is important to distinguish corruption, which entails the illegal sale of special favors, from political patronage, which occurs when public decision makers use their legal margin of discretion to confer favors on their friends and followers without receiving material benefits in return.

Corruption can have two different purposes. Politicians and public officials may sell favorable decisions in order to accumulate funds for political purposes, such as a future election campaign. They may also use bribes to accumulate private wealth. Of course, the boundary between political and personal corruption is fluid. If, for instance, a politician has little chance of winning a future election, he might use an illicitly filled campaign war chest for [End Page 109] private purposes—as Brazil’s former president Collor de Mello is rumored to have done.

Is the widespread impression of an upsurge in corruption in Latin America over the last two decades simply an artifact of rising standards and better reporting? After all, corruption is nothing new in the region. In earlier decades, however, people may not have had a clear sense of the separation between the public and private spheres and may not have condemned certain private uses of public office. Due to modernization and the diffusion of universalist standards, ever more people may have begun to brand it as bribery and corruption practices that in earlier years were deemed acceptable. Furthermore, the recent wave of dem-ocratization has freed the media from governmental control, making it much easier for investigative journalists to uncover cases of graft. What the secrecy and repression of military rule would have hidden from the public eye is now exposed to the public at large.

In all likelihood, rising standards of acceptable political behavior and the more avid reporting of corruption scandals have contributed to the popular notion that corruption in Latin America has been escalating. But there is also considerable evidence that bribery itself has become more widespread. The sums of money extracted by graft in recent years amount to tens—sometimes hundreds—of millions of dollars, a multiple of the “stakes” of earlier corruption scandals. In fact, the “going rates” for bribes seem to have risen. Under Brazil’s military government, for instance, contractors had to pay bureaucrats 8 to 12 percent of the value of a public works project to be awarded the deal. This percentage is said to have risen to 15 to 20 percent under the government of José Sarney, and to have hit a record 40 to 50 percent under the short-lived Collor de Mello administration—the first president elected by a direct popular vote in 29 years.³ Hence, the widespread impression of corruption’s increase is due only in part to rising standards and better reporting. To a large extent, it reflects a genuine rise in corruption.

³ Confidential author interviews with a businessman and military contractor, Rio de Janeiro, February 1990; and with an investment banker and former government official, S~ao Paulo, June 1995.

State Interventionism and Corruption

One of the most widely held explanations of corruption points to state intervention in the economy.⁴ By giving bureaucrats and politicians discretion over the allocation of vast resources, state interventionism creates enormous opportunities for the extraction of bribes. According to a Brazilian saying, state interventionism allows officials to *criar dificuldade para vender facilidade* (“create complications in order to sell solutions”). Entrepreneurs often bribe bureaucrats in order to gain unfair advantages in the allocation of public resources and in regulatory decisions. Since their profits depend on the favorable decisions of public officials, these entrepreneurs are [End Page 110] susceptible to blackmail. Can state intervention, which expanded in Latin America over many decades, account for the increase in corruption over the last 20 years?

In a number of cases, the answer is yes. In Mexico, the oil boom of the late 1970s led to a dramatic expansion of public investment under President López Portillo, enabling bureaucrats and politicians to siphon off more and bigger bribes than before.⁵ In Venezuela, the government of Jaime Lusinchi relied on a multiple exchange-rate system to obtain huge bribes.⁶ The country’s dependence on government-controlled oil income—particularly after the oil nationalization of 1976—explains why many consider Venezuela one of the most corrupt countries in Latin America.

But while explaining some cases of corruption, the argument invoking state interventionism cannot fully account for others. Indeed the logic of the interventionist argument suggests that with the recent advance of neoliberal reform, corruption ought to have declined. But scholars have found the opposite to be the case.⁷ The dismantling of state interventionism seems to have gone hand-in-hand with an increase in corruption, especially in Argentina under Menem and in Brazil under Collor, not to mention in Ecuador under the short-lived government of Abdalá Bucaram.⁸

It is important to note, however, that, strictly speaking, the prevalence of corruption during the enactment of neoliberal reform does not undermine the interventionist argument. Reducing the scope of governmental influence is, ironically, a task executed by the state itself. It is the state that has to coax the coddled private sector into market-conforming, entrepreneurial behavior; it is the state again that often has to overcome widespread resistance to neoliberal restructuring. In line with this “orthodox paradox,”

⁴ See Kaufmann, “Corruption,” 119; Domingo Cavallo, *El peso de la verdad: Un impulso a la transparencia en la Argentina de los 90* (Buenos Aires: Planeta, 1997), 249–69.

⁵ Stephen Morris, *Corruption and Politics in Contemporary Mexico* (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1991), 124–26.

⁶ Walter Little and Antonio Herrera, “Political Corruption in Venezuela,” in Walter Little and Eduardo Posada-Carbó, eds., *Political Corruption in Europe and Latin America* (New York: St. Martin’s, 1996), 270–73.

⁷ Manzetti and Blake, “Market Reform and Corruption,” 671–82.

⁸ Alberto Acosta, “Un país entre el ajuste y el desajuste,” *Quehacer* 106 (March–April 1997): 103–5.

⁹ state intervention increases during the elaboration and implementation of market reform—and this reform process may well increase opportunities for corruption. The sale of public enterprises, for instance, gives bureaucrats and politicians discretion over the reallocation of vast resources, widening their scope for personal gain. In exchange for bribes, they can lower the selling price or manipulate market conditions for the newly private firm, heralding, for example, the emergence of monopolies. This control over huge streams of future income can be used to obtain exorbitant bribes, as is said to have occurred during the first privatization deals concluded by the Menem administration.

Thus, a refined version of the state interventionism argument can, in principle, account for the persistence—if not the increase—in corruption during the enactment of market reform.

Notwithstanding its merits, the interventionist argument cannot explain such important cases as the bribery allegations that engulfed the Collor government in 1992, possibly the most notorious corruption [End Page 111] scandal in contemporary Latin America. In the area where neoliberal reform gives state officials discretion over a particularly large pool of resources—the privatization of parastatal enterprises—the record of the Collor government was actually quite clean. Learning from the domestic and international criticism that the Menem government had to face,¹⁰ the Collor administration followed fairly careful and transparent procedures in its sale of public assets. And while the president’s temporary confiscation of 70 percent of the country’s financial assets—the most heavy-handed state intervention ever executed in Brazil—enhanced opportunities for corruption, the drastically increased rates of the “commissions” that public contractors had to pay affected primarily traditional areas of state intervention, especially public-works projects, which did not expand under his administration. Instead, Collor and his henchmen simply forced entrepreneurs to pay higher bribes for favors that the latter had been used to receiving at cheaper rates from previous administrations.

Thus the argument from state interventionism, while important, cannot fully account for the cancerous growth of corruption in contemporary Latin America. A focus on opportunities alone does not seem to be sufficient. An examination of the incentives for politicians and bureaucrats to extract bribes may help solve the puzzle.

Democratization and Corruption

Can democratization itself trigger an increase in corruption, as opposed to merely promoting more vig-

⁹ Miles Kahler, “Orthodoxy and Its Alternatives,” in Joan Nelson, ed., *Economic Crisis and Policy Choice: The Politics of Adjustment in the Third World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), 55.

¹⁰ In early 1991, the U.S. ambassador to Argentina accused leading aides and cronies of Menem of extorting bribes from U.S. entrepreneurs, throwing the government into a severe crisis. See Horacio Verbitsky, *Robo para la corona: Los frutos prohibidos del árbol de la corrupción* (Buenos Aires: Planeta, 1991), 122–32.

ilant reporting of corruption? The dispersal of power that a transition from authoritarian to democratic rule entails extends the range of actors who need to consent to decisions over public-resource allocation. All of these new “veto players” can use their influence to extract bribes. Thus democratization increases the number of actors who can demand illicit payoffs. Since the old power holders who used to enjoy a monopoly over corruption resist a reduction in their own rewards, democratization may boost the aggregate amount of graft. The dependence of entrepreneurs on favorable political decisions and their capacity to pass on the cost of corruption to consumers via higher prices or to workers via lower wages facilitate the increase in bribery. In Brazil, for instance, democratization may account for the increase in the “commissions” extorted from public contractors, which went from 8 to 12 percent of the contract’s value under the military regime to 15 to 20 percent under the new civilian regime. Under authoritarian rule, it was sufficient to bribe officials in the executive branch of the federal government; with the return of democracy, officials in the state and municipal governments and legislators in Congress also demanded their share.

This argument helps account for the increase in corruption in several [End Page 112] new democracies, such as Brazil and Peru. But it cannot fully explain the growth of graft in Mexico, where, despite the slow liberalization of authoritarian rule, decisions over the allocation of economic resources continue to be monopolized by the federal government. Congressional delegates, who have minimal say over the budget, have insufficient influence to extort bribes. Nor can the democratization argument account for the rising corruption in Venezuela, a longstanding democracy that has suffered an involution toward more oligarchical control during the last 25 years.

Furthermore, the democratization argument needs to be dis-aggregated. A regime transition entails a whole host of changes, many of which have contradictory effects on corruption levels. While democratization extends the range of actors who have the power to demand bribes, it may also enhance overall accountability and thus prevent newly empowered actors—as well as old power holders—from misusing their clout for illicit enrichment.

While in principle democratization should tend to raise overall accountability, it may fail to do so in practice. In explaining why, some authors point to dysfunctional electoral rules and other inappropriate formal institutions, which are believed to enhance the independence of politicians from the citizenry and thus to keep their accountability low. Barbara Geddes and Artur Ribeiro Neto, for instance, focus on Brazil’s open-list system of proportional representation and the country’s fluid, fragmented party system.¹¹ A comparative perspective, however, reveals the limits of this argument. The open-list rule and the fragmented party system that characterized Chile before its 1973 coup were associated with low

¹¹ Barbara Geddes and Artur Ribeiro Neto, “Institutional Sources of Corruption in Brazil,” *Third World Quarterly* 13 (December 1992): 648–55.

corruption, whereas the closed-list system and two-party politics prevailing in Venezuela until the early 1990s coexisted with high levels of graft. Because the specific rules stressed by formal institutionalists differ widely across Latin America, they cannot by themselves account for the overall trend toward an increase in corruption in the region.

Neopopulism and Corruption

An important additional explanation for the recent increase in corruption in Latin America emphasizes the emergence of new forms of personalistic leadership over the past 15 years. This “neopopulism” has arisen for two main reasons.¹² First, the increasing modernization of society began to weaken established mechanisms of elite control, particularly clientelism and corporatism, thus rendering unorganized masses of people available for political mobilization. Second, the severe economic problems plaguing several Latin American countries during the 1980s delegitimated the established “political class,” making new charismatic leaders attractive to large numbers of people. [End Page 113]

Under these circumstances, neopopulist leaders in a number of Latin American countries have managed to win office thanks to their personalistic relationship with largely unorganized masses of followers. In developing ties with their people, neo populists have typically bypassed traditional channels such as political parties and trade unions. Whereas Latin America’s classical populists of the 1930s to 1950s targeted the working and lower-middle classes, incorporating them into new organizations such as parties and unions, contemporary populists appeal particularly to sectors that are excluded from these organizations, such as the urban informal sector and the rural poor. Neo Populists reach their followers primarily via television, while ascertaining the will of the people through opinion polls. Claiming to represent the “common good” against “special interests,” they distance themselves from established politicians and interest organizations.¹³ To confront the problems plaguing their countries, they concentrate power and demand a “free hand” in addressing crises as they see fit.¹⁴ In this uninstitutionalized type of rule, formal procedures have been sacrificed for the sake of efficacy. Prototypes of neopopulist leaders include Peru’s Alan García and Alberto Fujimori, Brazil’s Fernando Collor de Mello, Argentina’s Carlos Menem, and—to a lesser extent—Venezuela’s Carlos Andrés Pérez and Rafael Caldera. Mexico’s Carlos Salinas also used some neopopulist tactics—such as bypassing the entrenched party hacks of the ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party—to strengthen his personal authority.

¹² On Latin American neopopulism, see Kenneth Roberts, “Neoliberalism and the Transformation of Populism in Latin America: The Peruvian Case,” *World Politics* 48 (October 1995): 82–116; Kurt Weyland, “Neopopulism and Neoliberalism in Latin America: Unexpected Affinities,” *Studies in Comparative International Development* 31 (Fall 1996): 3–31. Guillermo O’Donnell advances a similar notion in “Delegative Democracy,” *Journal of Democracy* 5 (January 1994): 55–69.

¹³ At the same time, however, they maintain personal connections with important powers-that-be, such as the military and business conglomerates.

¹⁴ O’Donnell, “Delegative Democracy,” 65.

The emergence of neopopulist leadership has contributed to the rise in corruption in Latin America in two significant ways. First, the low accountability of personalistic politicians has enabled them to obtain bribes. Second, to hold together their precarious, unorganized support bases and to prepare themselves for future political campaigns, neopopulist leaders need vast sums of money. Their heavy reliance on expensive ways of reaching their followers, especially television, intensifies their resource needs. These needs are often satisfied through corrupt means.

The concentrated power of neopopulist leaders, their wide margin of autonomy, and their capacity to discredit critics and opponents as “enemies of the people” or “rent-seekers” lead to low accountability. While the leaders do have to prove their effectiveness, they need not respect formal rules. In fact, they frequently depict these rules as obstacles to effective governance and problem-solving. Not surprisingly, their disregard for legal norms and the weakening of [End Page 114] institutional safeguards—such as judicial independence—open the door to corruption. Even if a leader himself is not directly involved—as seems to be the case with Peru’s Alberto Fujimori¹⁵—his entourage, often comprising family members or personal cronies, tends to take illicit advantage of its low accountability.

Significant though it may be, one should not overestimate the extent to which the low accountability of neopopulist leaders has contributed to the rise of corruption in Latin America. Accountability can only limit graft if those in positions of political and judicial authority are themselves incorruptible. In Latin America, this is seldom the case. Rather than guaranteeing clean government, parliamentarians and judges often try to get in on shady dealings, joining pacts of impunity to protect the corrupt. Historically, the weakness of popular representation in many Latin American democracies has given parliamentarians wide latitude for pursuing their own private interests, luring many to indulge in underhand practices. Since corruption was widespread well before the rise of neopopulism, a concentration of power in the hands of neopopulist leaders and the resulting diminution of horizontal accountability may not, in and of themselves, increase overall levels of corruption.

Such concentration of power can lead, however, to the concentration of corruption proceeds in the hands of a leader and his cronies, frustrating the greed of other politicians. This monopolization of bribery makes newly excluded politicians more willing to turn against perpetrators of corruption in the executive branch. Hence, neopopulist leaders’ lack of accountability may, paradoxically, increase the likelihood that their corruption will be revealed and that the ensuing scandals will threaten their political survival.

¹⁵ Given the hermetic nature of the Fujimori government, it is difficult to gauge the level of corruption in contemporary Peru. Many rumors and accusations have focused on the president’s entourage, especially intelligence advisor Vladimiro Montesinos and top military leaders, but Fujimori himself seems relatively untainted. An important reason why Fujimori—in stark contrast to other neopopulist leaders—may not be directly involved in corrupt practices is his complete control over the Peruvian state. He has drawn upon the state’s resources—such as the extensive social programs he implemented before winning reelection in 1995—to build his own following. Neopopulist leaders who have not succeeded in controlling their state as completely as has Fujimori find it more difficult to use public resources to strengthen their support base and thus feel a greater need to rely on illicitly acquired resources.

More than by lowering accountability, neopopulism boosts overall levels of corruption by raising resource needs. Personalistic leaders need to accumulate massive funds to maintain and extend their fluid political support among the unorganized masses. Since these leaders seek to bypass established channels, they rely little on existing party networks and longstanding political loyalties. Rather, neopopulist leaders seek to build their network of followers virtually from scratch. Many ways of doing so are prohibitively expensive. In particular, television advertisements and opinion polls—the main channels of contact with their mass following—are very costly. Paying a personal staff requires considerable sums of money. The need for air transportation in large countries like Argentina and Brazil creates additional costs. While all politicians in the age of the mass media incur such expenses, personalistic leaders, who command little if any firm, organized support, must campaign with particular vigor, and they thus confront enormous resource needs. Since neopopulists depend primarily on expensive new political [End Page 115] instruments such as television, their political survival requires continual high spending.

To cover the expenses of their ongoing campaigns (essential for maintaining their precarious support bases), neopopulist leaders “need” to resort to corruption. This political necessity was probably a crucial motive behind President Collor’s extravagant bribery scheme. While the Brazilian president also siphoned off funds for private use, a large chunk of the exorbitant “commissions” extracted from entrepreneurs by his cronies was earmarked for future political campaigns.¹⁶ Thus, Collor’s corrupt practices stemmed to a large extent from the resource needs created by his neopopulist style of governance, especially from the need to maintain his fluid, unorganized following. While Argentina’s Menem has relied more on the existing organization of the Peronist party, he has, on several occasions, bypassed the party apparatus, recruited nonpoliticians as candidates, and helped them win elections.¹⁷ Venezuela’s Pérez also aided the rise of younger politicians as part of a (not very successful) strategy to wrest control over his Acción Democrática party from its established leadership. The need to create one’s own group of supporters independent of an entrenched party apparatus requires considerable funds, and is probably one of the main motivations for the extraction of bribes.

Given the absence of a firm organizational basis, neopopulist leaders use corruption not only to attract a mass public, but also to maintain loyalty among and control over their direct political aides and bureaucratic underlings. Common involvement in misdeeds creates shared interests and bonds of loyalty, including a willingness to come to one another’s defense in order to cover up shady dealings.¹⁸ Given the leader’s superior position and the fact that underlings do all the “dirty work” and are therefore more directly compromised, corruption also reinforces hierarchical control. Any follower who considers defecting will think twice because a “traitor” could be destroyed by a tax audit, by a police investigation,

¹⁶ ‘Esqema PC’ Was Also a Bid for Power,’ Latin American Weekly Report, WR-92-46 (26 November 1992), 3.

¹⁷ The most noteworthy cases are former race-car driver Carlos Reuteman, singer Ramón “Palito” Ortega, and speedboat driver Daniel Scioli.

¹⁸ I owe this idea to Marcos Novaro, Instituto Gino Germani, University of Buenos Aires.

or—as a last resort—by public accusations. These threats keep supporters in line. An underling’s involvement in corruption is thus the informal equivalent of the undated, signed letter of resignation that some presidents demand before making appointments to important public posts. In the uninstitutionalized politics of neopopulism, this means of control, which induces leaders to favor their underlings’ involvement in bribery, is particularly important.

While neopopulist leaders and their aides employ corrupt means to enhance their chances of continued political success, bribery proceeds also serve as a private insurance fund in case of failure. The inchoate, precarious nature of neopopulism increases the uncertainty that personalistic leaders and their principal supporters must face. Whereas politicians who can draw on organized support have some cushion [End Page 116] against crises and challenges, the political survival of neopopulists is in constant jeopardy. This high level of uncertainty intensifies the need for neopopulist leaders to prepare for a life after politics. While corruption is rife in countries with extensive elite turnover (as in Brazil and Mexico),¹⁹ the political risks facing neopopulist leaders further heighten their incentive to engage in bribery. Thus neopopulism exacerbates both political and personal corruption.

Neopopulism and Scandals

If the precarious nature of the support on which they rely makes neopopulist leaders especially prone to corruption, it also makes them particularly vulnerable to corruption scandals. As soon as political fortune turns against these personalistic leaders, their support base can wither away rapidly, leaving them exposed to the onslaught of accusations and attacks. It is significant that the two Latin American presidents whose corruption led to impeachment—Brazil’s Collor and Venezuela’s Pérez—were both neopopulist leaders. By contrast, politicians with more organized bases of support have managed to survive similar corruption scandals, as the cases of Venezuela’s Jaime Lusinchi and Colombia’s Ernesto Samper demonstrate.

Neopopulist politics thus tends to raise not only the level of corruption in a particular country, but also the likelihood that this corruption will prove politically fatal to its perpetrators. Yet the connection between these two outcomes—corruption and its consequences for the perpetrator—is less direct than one might assume. Neopopulist leaders are not simply more at risk of being removed from office on corruption charges because they engage in more egregious graft. Rather, it is their fluid political base that accounts for their vulnerability. Indeed, while Collor was clearly more corrupt than his predecessor, this does not seem to have been true in Pérez’s case. Although Lusinchi and his cronies obtained massive bribes through a multiple exchange-rate scheme involving heavy-handed state interventionism, Lusinchi

¹⁹ Peter H. Smith, *Labyrinths of Power: Political Recruitment in Twentieth-Century Mexico* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), 270.

ended his term unchallenged.²⁰ By contrast, the evidence of corruption against Pérez was comparatively flimsy, and yet he was convicted. The impetus for Pérez's impeachment was not so much his alleged corruption as the widespread fear that Venezuela's democracy might not survive if this highly unpopular leader continued in office. Inspired by Collor's impeachment in Brazil, Venezuela's politicians and civil society found a legal way to unseat the president and thus contain the political crisis triggered by the unprecedented coup attempt of February 1992.

A comparison of Menem's and Collor's fates provides further [End Page 117] evidence for the thoroughly political nature of corruption scandals. Like Collor during his first two years in office, Menem and his entourage have faced constant charges of corruption. One outward sign that has raised public suspicion is Menem's luxurious lifestyle, which seems difficult to square with his official salary. Nevertheless, Menem has so far survived these accusations, whereas Collor was removed from office. While the spectacular revelations made by Collor's own brother help explain this outcome, a more important reason is the different levels of success that these two neopopulist leaders attained. Whereas Menem's government managed to stop hyperinflation and engineer an economic recovery, Collor's stabilization efforts threw Brazil into a prolonged recession, and thus met with far less enthusiasm. When Collor was unable to fulfill his central campaign promise, he lost the support of politicians and voters alike. It was the precarious nature of his neopopulist leadership, with its dependence on unstable and largely unorganized support, that made Collor particularly vulnerable to corruption charges. A president with more committed supporters might well have managed to ride out the storm, as Fernando Henrique Cardoso succeeded in doing in the recent scandal over the alleged buying of congressional votes for his reelection amendment, and as Ernesto Samper managed to do in Colombia, despite incontrovertible evidence of shady campaign contributions by drug traffickers.²¹

Another indication of the deeply political nature of corruption scandals is the fact that many of the politicians who accused Collor and Pérez and who voted for their removal from office had themselves engaged in corruption, as revealed by the congressional budget scandal that broke out in Brazil barely one year after Collor's impeachment. During Collor's time in office, several politicians—among them many of his erstwhile supporters—had wanted to use accusations of corruption to weaken the president (while keeping him in office), make him more dependent on their support, and thus strengthen their political influence and control over patronage. When the persistent research of investigative journalists, the spectacular revelations in the media, and the growing anger in public opinion made it impossible to contain the corruption scandal, these politicians sought to focus popular outrage on the most outstanding offender so as to divert attention from their own misdeeds. Since they feared that further investigations

²⁰ Little and Herrera, "Political Corruption," 270–82.

²¹ "Corruption and Drugs in Colombia: Democracy at Risk," Washington, D.C., Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 104th Cong., 2nd session, 1996.

would unveil the entire network of corruption in Brazilian politics, they decided to impeach Collor quickly in order to [End Page 118] save their own skins. Thus, while Collor and his entourage were clearly guilty of corruption,²² they also served as scapegoats: they were “sacrificed” for the sake of many other politicians—among them, many of Collor’s accusers, such as Paulo Maluf, Orestes Quéricia, and José Sarney—who also faced credible charges of corruption.²³

Despite their political nature, corruption scandals are an important sign of progress in countries that have suffered from endemic corruption. These scandals demonstrate that the moral standards for assessing politicians and state officials have risen and that many citizens now insist on a stricter separation of the private and public spheres. Fewer and fewer Latin Americans are dismissing the corruption charges of their political leaders with the Brazilian saying *rouba mas faz* (“he steals, but gets things done”). Instead, the spread of universalist values and norms, boosted in many cases by the return of democracy, has induced a growing number of citizens to place a higher premium on equality before the law and to reject the pacts of impunity by which corrupt politicians and state officials have sought to protect themselves. Ironically, neopopulist leaders often use charges of corruption to discredit the established “political class” and to muster mass support, thus helping to raise the very standards by which they themselves are judged—and often found wanting. Protracted economic crises and rigorous neoliberal adjustment programs have disproportionately burdened the middle class, reducing their willingness to overlook politicians’ lavish spending habits made possible by corruption proceeds. The slow but potentially irreversible change in values resulting from these political and economic developments has heightened the probability that massive corruption will prove politically fatal to its perpetrators.

For this reason, the recent corruption scandals in Latin America were pressed not only by opportunistic, self-centered politicians, but also by a more vigilant public committed to universalist standards of morally appropriate behavior. It is the interaction of these contradictory forces that has exposed neopopulist leaders to the threat of being removed from office on corruption charges. By bypassing parties and interest organizations, by relying on fickle mass support, and by snubbing established politicians, personalistic leaders exacerbate their risk of political failure. Hence, neopopulism helps to account not only for the rise in corruption levels in Latin America over the last 15 years, but also, in some cases, for the unprecedented impeachment of leaders on corruption charges.

To be comprehensive, a theory of corruption must account for the multiple, often contradictory forces that guide individuals to misuse their power for private ends. Likewise, if campaigns against corruption are to succeed, they must be attentive to the various factors that [End Page 119] encourage its spread.

²² Congresso Nacional do Brasil, Relatório final da comissão parlamentar mista de inquérito 11 (Brasília: National Congress, 1992), esp. 358–66.

²³ José Nêumanne, *Atrás do palanque: Bastidores da eleição 1989* (São Paulo: Edições Siciliano, 1998), 26, 103; Brasil, Senado Federal, Comissão Parlamentar de Inquérito: Relatório de CPI que apurou irregularidades na administração pública federal (Brasília: Federal Senate, 1989), 168–70.

Statistical analyses of bribery that assume causal homogeneity in large samples of cases run the risk of hiding as much as they reveal.²⁴ The opportunities presented by state interventionism and nontransparent neoliberal reform, the incentives offered by democratization and the drug trade, and the rise of Neo populism have all contributed to the escalation of bribery in Latin America. In itself, each perspective offers a piece of the puzzle, but not the whole picture. Comparative case studies that seek to identify all these different causal factors and that analyze the complex ways in which they intersect provide a far more reliable framework for investigating the spread of corruption.²⁵

The Terrorism, Transnational Crime and Corruption Center (TraCCC)

Dr. Louise Shelley | *The challenge* / February 2020

The profits from illicit natural resource trade in fish, timber and wildlife are estimated to be between USD 62.5 billion and 316.4 billion annually.

These funds are usually transferred through banks, corporations and other accounts in the international financial system. “Following the money,” confiscating it and arresting the money launderers, however, has received less attention than arresting the individuals most closely associated with illegal shipments, poached animals or undocumented catch. Yet this next step helps reveal the networks that finance, facilitate and grow rich from environmental crimes, and it is key to preventing these crimes and related corruption because the illicit gains have minimal value if they can’t be used in the international financial system. By following the money flows, it is possible to target the perpetrators and their facilitating networks (Haenlein and Keatinge 2017; Rose 2014) and ensure that crime does not pay.

Money laundering – the basics

The processes by which criminally-derived property may be laundered are many, but they typically involve three stages (see Figure 1):

- * Placement, in which criminally derived funds are introduced in the financial system;
- * Layering, in which the property is ‘washed,’ and its ownership and source is disguised; and
- * Integration, in which the ‘laundered’ property is re-introduced into the legitimate economy.

Movement of money can occur in the simplest form of cash, or it can range to complex schemes through banks, real estate, trade-based money laundering and even crypto-currencies. Examples related to natural resources include the following:

²⁴ See for instance Alberto Ades and Rafael Di Tella, “The New Economics of Corruption: A Survey and Some New Results,” *Political Studies* 45 (1997): 496–515.

²⁵ See the methodological approach outlined in Charles C. Ragin, *The Comparative Method: Moving Beyond Qualitative and Quantitative Strategies* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), which pays particular attention to “multiple conjunctural causation.”

- * The deforestation of Gambia generated an estimated USD 356 million over twenty years. The country's president Yahya Jammeh moved profits through cash and well-recognized international banks.
- * Funds generated by illegal deforestation in Sarawak were laundered into real estate in the United States that was later occupied by the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation.
- * Profits from illegal export of rock lobster from South Africa to the U.S., amounting to tens of millions of dollars, were hidden in an offshore account in Jersey, making them untouchable by law enforcement.
- * In a 2015 case involving the U.S. company Lumber Liquidators, illegally-cut timber was laundered
- * into the legitimate supply chain through trade based money laundering. This was the largest financial penalty for timber trafficking under the U.S. Lacey Act which bans trafficking in illegal wildlife, plants and plant products.
- * The newest tendency is to launder money through cryptocurrencies, which can be traded with great anonymity. These are being increasingly used for online purchases allowing for the illicit trade of natural resources

An Indonesian success story?

The Indonesian Corruption Eradication Commission (Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi, KPK) has gained a significant reputation for investigating high-level corruption since its founding in 2003. It has investigated and tried high-level targets and has a high conviction rate.

Unlike other anti-corruption bodies, the KPK has focused on natural resource investigations, especially the corruption associated with the timber sector. In the early 2000s, a parliament member was sentenced to eight years imprisonment for accepting bribes to allow the conversion of protected forest zones into land where trees could be cut. Subsequently, in 2007, two government officials and an executive of a logging company were sentenced for illegal logging. The following year, an eleven-year sentence was handed down to a government regent for his role in illegal logging

By 2014, one third of regents (heads of district governments) were under investigation for corruption, primarily for issuing logging permits in violation of regulations, mainly to allow expansion of oil palm plantations. The KPK investigations suggest that Indonesia may have lost as much as USD 9 billion in revenues from 2003 to 2014 due to companies under-reporting timber production. Fees and royalties were collected only on approximately 19-23 percent of total timber production.

The KPK for many years sustained efforts to investigate systemic domestic corruption in the natural resource sector and had positive results. Following the money and examining permitting agreements helped bring high-level officials to trial and held them accountable. Significant constraints on the KPK's

powers and independence imposed in late 2019 reveals the difficulty in maintain long-term efforts against corruption in the face of powerful interests.

Is it possible to follow the money in a highly corrupt environment?

Following the money has been used to pursue corrupt actors even in highly corrupt environments. Investigations of corrupt leaders and their financing have provided insights on the networks, assets, and sometimes even personal movements. This process has been used against corrupt officials who have moved their money to the U.S., France, the United Kingdom, Switzerland, and other countries. For example:

- * The Sovereign wealth fund of Malaysia (1MDB) whose resources were invested in the U.S. by corrupt officials (Wright and Hope 2018).
- * France charged the daughter of the president of the Congo with money laundering.
- * Switzerland is now returning laundered funds stolen by former Nigerian President Sani Abacha.

While less has been done in countries of the Global South to counter money laundering related to corruption, there are some noted exceptions from Latin America and Asia that reveal the impact of carefully executed investigations even in highly corrupt environments.

- * In Brazil, a major investigation of corruption in construction and oil sectors, among others, have led to the payment of USD 2.6 billion in fines in the U.S. and Switzerland and have implicated the top leadership of Brazil and other Latin American countries. At present every former president of Peru is now under investigation as a result of the Brazilian judicial investigations.
- * The United Nations (UN)-sponsored International Commission against Impunity in Corruption (CICIG) in Guatemala made enormous strides in tackling corruption and following illicit financial flows until high-level officials blocked its efforts. Corruption investigations in Africa reveal the role of officials, particularly the police, but little has been done by African authorities to follow the money, (OECD 2018).

Lessons and recommendations

Partner with civil society groups: Many of the investigations noted above were initiated or supported by investigative journalism and engaged nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Efforts to galvanize civil society more broadly against different forms of corruption and illicit trade may also have a positive impact on environmental outcomes, as illegal natural resource activities often converge with other forms of illegal activity. At the same time, programmatic support for civil society and investigative journalism should also take into account the very real risks to environmental defenders and those investigating corruption. Thirteen environmental journalists have been killed and there are 16 more suspicious deaths in the last decade.

Develop knowledge and capacity: Providing training both domestically and internationally to individuals in leadership roles in combating transnational crime may be useful. Donors, NGOs, and international organizations can provide invaluable assistance. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) holds fora on anti-corruption, and multi-national bodies such as the Organization of American States and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) provide advice on enhancing anti-corruption capacity. American organizations also have resources that can be used to advance these efforts. For example, USAID missions can recommend leaders on protection of environmental resources to International Visitor Leadership Program (supported by the U.S. Department of State) on transnational crime, anti-corruption and illicit financial flows. Individuals working in government ministries on natural resource issues can be recommended for Humphrey programs to develop capacity that will be used by the individual on return home to apply techniques learned in the U.S. on mechanisms to protect natural resources.

Consider international options: Several countries and international entities now have laws that facilitate investigation and prosecution of illegal actions through financial investigations. The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) in the United States has been used extensively to target corruption related to the oil sector in many Latin American countries. Large scale multi-national investigations in Brazil started with the Odebrecht case but major investigations concerning bribery have been initiated in Argentina, Ecuador, and Colombia. An indictment in Florida in 2018 addressed money laundering in the U.S. and illicit financial flows from Latin America resulting from illegal gold mining. Full text: <https://tracc.gmu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Introductory-Overview-Why-is-money-laundering-a-critical-issue-in-natural-resource-corruption.pdf>

A Socially Conservative Left Is Gaining Traction in Latin America

Dr. Paul Angelo | *Council on Foreign Relations* | July 7, 2021

It's no secret that the Latin American left has a strongman problem. From Havana to Caracas to Managua, self-proclaimed socialists are notorious for taking office only to never step down. But while left-wing autocrats and their human rights abuses garner much media attention, an emerging crop of leftist politicians in Latin America poses a more insidious threat: they're embracing regressive social values. If they continue to fail in elevating the causes of equality, diversity and individual freedom, the new leaders on the left will leave the region's most vulnerable and underrepresented communities at great risk. Socially progressive causes began to lose their luster in the mid-2010s, especially as evangelical groups with hardline stances on abortion and LGBTQ rights – and equipped with mega-churches – expanded as a voting bloc. Right-wing politicians like Brazil's Jair Bolsonaro swept back into office, styling themselves as defenders of “traditional family values.” Donald Trump proved a convincing example to follow.

Now, after years spent championing the cause of women and minorities, Latin American leftists have

veered to the right on social issues, leaning into traditionally conservative positions on gender equality, abortion access, LGBTQ rights, immigration, and the environment. The left's conservative turn leaves marginalized communities bereft of their traditional political allies and jeopardizes freedom and safety. And if an economically populist yet socially conservative platform continues to prove a winning electoral formula, as it did earlier this month in Peru, nationwide poverty relief may ultimately come at the cost of individual rights.

On the gender equality front, evidence of this shift is everywhere. Mexico's President Andrés Manuel López Obrador campaigned on rectifying the gender pay gap and gender-based violence. But rather than meeting with women protesting the country's record-setting levels of femicide, López Obrador shut out the protesters' chants by erecting a ten-foot-high wall around the presidential palace.

Peru's new socialist president-elect, Pedro Castillo, chalked up his country's femicide problem to male "idleness," blasting what he calls "gender ideology" taught in Peruvian schools. And Ecuador, governed by leftist administrations for most of the last two decades, has among the strictest anti-abortion laws in the world. Rafael Correa, in office from 2007 to 2017, even pressured his own party to keep the abortion ban in place.

Despite the expansion of LGBTQ rights during a wave of left and center-left presidents in the early 2000s, these communities have fared poorly under some on the left.

While strongmen like Nicolás Maduro have never been shy about using homophobia for political gain, the Dominican Republic's "social democrat" president, Luis Abinader, disappointed activists when he publicly rejected same-sex marriage protections under considerable pressure from religious leaders; he, too, has backtracked on liberalizing abortion access. El Salvador's populist president, Nayib Bukele, who started his career on the political left as mayor of the country's capital and once declared himself an "ally" to LGBTQ people, has since come out against marriage equality and stopped his government's sexual diversity work.

Around the world, xenophobia against immigrants is often the calling card of the radical right. In Latin America, the inverse is sometimes true. López Obrador has militarized Mexico's southern border, deploying tear gas and rubber bullets against Central American migrant caravans. Peru's Castillo insists that undocumented migrants will be given 72 hours to flee the country after he takes office. And Argentina's leftist president recently sparked outrage with his remark that "Brazilians emerged from the jungle but we Argentines arrived on boats. On boats from Europe."

In Latin America, environmental policy is also a social issue because the costs of climate change land

heavily on ethnic and racial minorities. Leftist politicians – who often rely on natural resources to achieve their priority of redistributing wealth – have all too frequently sided against the environment and its defenders in the process.

In Ecuador's April election, progressive presidential candidate Andrés Arauz – who narrowly lost – dug in his heels on oil drilling in the Amazon over loud objections by indigenous groups. Bolivia's socialist President Luis Arce, too, was chided by the environmental movement for allowing agribusinesses to run wild with deforestation, fueling catastrophic forest fires while he served as finance minister in 2019.

Who to turn to?

For decades, left and center-left parties oversaw a period of expanding rights and protections for women and minorities, challenging the status quo in a region long dominated by conservatism and the Catholic church.

But now, many on the left, eager to reclaim power, capitalized on the trend sweeping voters by parroting social conservatives. The shift wasn't all-encompassing. Some important voices, like Chile's Michele Bachelet and Costa Rica's Carlos Alvarado, stuck by their progressive roots. But more leftists have opted for the right-wing veer than not.

2022 will be a decisive year. Brazil and Colombia, two of the Americas' most populous countries, will hold presidential elections. Conservative candidates are polling poorly and will have to face down popular leftist challengers. Brazil's former president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, who governed as a social progressive, is likely to make a comeback bid and, should he win, has the credibility and appeal to corral new consensus across borders.

In a region that is both young and increasingly urban, the writing is on the wall: the electoral advantage the left stands to gain today by echoing the right is a risky gamble – one that could translate into lasting credibility losses among the voters of tomorrow. Individual rights need a political champion. If not the right or the left, then who?

<https://www.cfr.org/article/socially-conservative-left-gaining-traction-latin-america>

Recommended Reading

Barno, David and Nora Bensahel, “Five Ways the U.S. Military Will Change after the Pandemic,” *War on the Rocks*, April 28, 2020. Link: <https://warontherocks.com/2020/04/five-ways-the-u-s-military-will-change-after-the-pandemic/> Vision 2020, Defense Security Cooperation Agency’s (DSCA) (updated 2016) https://www.dscamilitary.com/sites/default/files/dsca_vision_2020_update_2.pdf

“DOD Security Cooperation: An Overview of Authorities and Issues,” *Congressional Research Service*, Aug 23, 2016

“What Is ‘Building Partner Capacity?’ Issues for Congress,” *Congressional Research Service (CRS)*, December 18, 2015

“Foreign Aid: An Introduction to U.S. Programs and Policy,” *Congressional Research Service*, April 16, 2019

Christopher Paul, Colin P. Clarke, Beth Grill, Stephanie Young, Jennifer D. P. Moroney, Joe Hogler, Christine Leah, “What Works Best When Building Partner Capacity?” *Rand Corporation*, 2013.

U.S. Agency for International Development, Aid Tracker (1945-2019)
<https://explorer.usaid.gov/aid-trends.html>

Foreign Military Training Report (FMTR), U.S. Department of Defense
Link: <https://www.state.gov/reports/foreign-military-training-and-dod-engagement-activities-of-interest-2019-2020/>

Celina Realuyo, “‘Following the Money Trail’ to Combat Terrorism, Crime, and Corruption in the Americas,” *William J. Perry Center Regional Insight*, August 2017.

Link (English): <http://williamjperrycenter.org/sites/all/modules/pubdlnet/pubdlnet.php?fid=356>

Link (Spanish): <http://williamjperrycenter.org/sites/all/modules/pubdlnet/pubdlnet.php?fid=357>

DAY 5

Friday, 19 November 2021 / viernes, 18 19 de noviembre 2021

Budget Process and Cyber Security

0900-0910 Daily Introduction / Introducción diaria

0910-1030 The U.S. Budget Process / El proceso presupuestario de los EEUU

Dr. Thomas G. Mahnken
President and Chief Executive Officer of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA)

Mr. Mark Cancian
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)

Moderator:
Dr. Fabiana Perera

1030-1045 BREAK / DESCANSO

1045-1200 Cyber Security / Seguridad cibernética

Dr. Melissa Griffith
Wilson Center

General de Brigada Porfirio Fuentes
Mexican Army, Director General, IADB Secretariat

Moderator:
Dr. Boris Saavedra

1200-1215 Concluding Remarks / Observaciones finales
TBD



Friday Speaker Biographies

Dr. Thomas Mahnken

Dr. Thomas G. Mahnken is President and Chief Executive Officer of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments.

He is a Senior Research Professor at the Philip Merrill Center for Strategic Studies at The Johns Hopkins University's Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS).

He currently serves as a member of the Congressionally-mandated National Defense Strategy Commission and as a member of the Board of Visitors of Marine Corps University. His previous government career includes service as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Policy Planning from 2006–2009, where he helped craft the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review and 2008 National Defense Strategy. He served on the staff of the 2014 National Defense Panel, 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review Independent Panel, and the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction. He served in the Defense Department's Office of Net Assessment and as a member of the Gulf War Air Power Survey. He served for 24 years as an officer in the U.S. Navy Reserve, to include tours in Iraq and Kosovo.

In 2009 he was awarded the Secretary of Defense Medal for Outstanding Public Service and in 2016 the Department of the Navy Superior Civilian Service Medal.

Dr. Mahnken is the author of *The Gathering Pacific Storm: Emerging U.S.-China Strategic Competition in Defense Technological and Industrial Development* (Cambria University Press, 2018), *Arms Races in International Politics from the Nineteenth to the Twenty-First Century* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), *Strategy in Asia: The Past, Present and Future of Regional Security* (Stanford University Press, 2014), *Competitive Strategies for the 21st Century: Theory, History, and Practice* (Stanford University Press, 2012), *Technology and the American Way of War Since 1945* (Columbia University Press, 2008), and *Uncovering Ways of War: U.S. Intelligence and Foreign Military Innovation, 1918–1941* (Cornell University Press, 2002), among other works.

Mark Cancian

Mark Cancian (Colonel, USMCR, ret.) is a senior adviser with the CSIS International Security Program. He joined CSIS in April 2015 from the Office of Management and Budget, where he spent more than seven years as chief of the Force Structure and Investment Division, working on issues such as Depart-

ment of Defense budget strategy, war funding, and procurement programs, as well as nuclear weapons development and nonproliferation activities in the Department of Energy. Previously, he worked on force structure and acquisition issues in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and ran research and executive programs at Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government. In the military, Colonel Cancian spent over three decades in the U.S. Marine Corps, active and reserve, serving as an infantry, artillery, and civil affairs officer and on overseas tours in Vietnam, Desert Storm, and Iraq (twice). Since 2000, he has been an adjunct faculty member at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, where he teaches a course on the connection between policy and analysis. A prolific author, he has published over 40 articles on military operations, acquisition, budgets, and strategy and received numerous writing awards. He graduated with high honors (*magna cum laude*) from Harvard College and with highest honors (Baker scholar) from Harvard Business School.

Dr. Melissa Griffith

Dr. Melissa K. Griffith is a Senior Program Associate with the Science and Technology Innovation Program (STIP) at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars; a Non-Resident Research Fellow at the University of California, Berkeley's Center for Long-Term Cybersecurity (CLTC); and an Adjunct Professor at Georgetown's Center for Security Studies (CSS). She works at the intersection between technology and national security with a specialization in cybersecurity, semiconductors, and 5G networks. Her work sheds important light on the components and dynamics of cyber power and cyber conflict, as well as the vital role that public-private cooperation and both security and economic policy play in national defense. Prior to joining the Wilson Center, Griffith was a Pre-Doctoral Fellow at Stanford University's Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) and a Visiting Research Fellow at the Research Institute on the Finnish Economy (ETLA) in Helsinki, Finland. Griffith holds a Ph.D. and an M.A. in Political Science from the University of California, Berkeley and a B.A. in International Relations from Agnes Scott College.

General de Brigada Porfirio Fuentes

General de Brigada Porfirio Fuentes Vélez is currently the Director General of the Secretariat of the Inter-American Defense Board, which focuses on providing the Organization of American States (OAS) technical and educational services regarding military and defense issues in the Hemisphere. Besides being a professor in Public Administration and having specialized in the Escuela de Aplicación de las Armas, he took a bachelor's degree in Military Administration at the Escuela Superior de Guerra and also a master's degree in Administration for Internal Security and National Defense in the Colegio de Defensa Nacional. Prior to his new assignment, he served as Head of Course and Titular Professor of the subjects of Geopolitics, Public and Military Administration in the Joint Staff and of Command and Leadership in

the Escuela Superior de Guerra, as Deputy Director of the General Directorate of Archives and History of the Secretariat of National Defense, Commander in High Impact Operations, to reduce violence in Tamaulipas in 2010 and in San Luis Potosí in 2013, and Commander of La Laguna Special commando. Abroad he was Military and Air Attaché of Mexico in the Republic of Salvador from 2014 to 2016 .

Highlighted Readings for Friday

Six ways the US can maximize its strategic benefit from defense spending

Dr. Thomas G. Mahnken | *Defense News* | April 24, 2020

The massive price tag associated with the response to the new coronavirus, COVID-19, coupled with the inevitable impact of the pandemic on the U.S. economy, threatens to blow a hole in the defense budget at a time when the challenges posed by China, Russia, Iran and North Korea show no signs of abating. Leaders in both the executive and legislative branches will need to make tough strategic choices to keep the United States strong in these challenging times.

Secretary of Defense Mark Esper, his predecessor Jim Mattis and the bipartisan National Defense Strategy Commission all agree that annual increases in the defense budget on the order of 3-5 percent are required to implement the 2018 National Defense Strategy. Even absent the pandemic, the chances of getting such resources seemed uncertain at best. The Trump administration's own budget projections show the defense budget in the coming years as flat or declining. Now, a flat budget more and more appears to be the rosier scenario.

More worrisome, and increasingly likely, is the possibility of major cuts to the defense budget. Indeed, cuts on the order of 20-25 percent are not unthinkable. Merely pointing out that such a move would jeopardize U.S. security is unlikely to prevent it. Similarly, noting — correctly — that defense spending is one of the most stimulative forms of federal spending may prove insufficient to forestall cuts.

How can the United States realize the greatest economic and military benefit from the defense budget in the coming years? Below are a half-dozen guidelines to help the United States get the maximum strategic benefit from defense spending in this challenging time:

1. Keep production lines going.

Now is not the time to be cutting back on defense production. To the contrary, keeping existing weapons production lines active makes both military and economic sense. The U.S. military is in many ways still living off the Reagan-era defense buildup of the 1980s and is sorely in need of modernization.

Keeping defense production going also makes good economic sense. In a period of rising unemploy-

ment, employing as many Americans as possible will help the United States weather the economic storm brought on by COVID-19. The government should also be flexible in administering the cost and schedule of contracts, given the pandemic's impact on the defense-industrial base.

2. Stock up.

Now is also the time to increase orders of things we know that we need but have not purchased enough of, such as munitions. As the NDS Commission found in 2018, the United States has under-invested in precision munitions such as the Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile-Extended Range and Long Range Anti-Ship Missile. Ramping up production of munitions and other expendables will not only boost employment but also help the United States better prepare for a future conflict where such munitions will be in high demand.

3. Be selective in divesting.

The United States should also divest itself of aging capabilities but be thoughtful in doing so. It makes sense to retire old ships and aircraft because the cost of maintaining those systems goes up considerably as they age. It makes much less sense to divest relatively new systems that have plenty of life left in them. For example, the Air Force has proposed shutting down production of the MQ-9 Reaper and retiring more than two-thirds of its RQ-4 Global Hawk fleet.

4. Get the most out of what we have.

Whereas economic conditions may have changed, the external threats that we face have not. As a result, there is an urgent need to develop new ways of war, particularly those that use more effective capabilities that we have. For example, as I have argued elsewhere, non-stealthy unmanned aerial systems such as the MQ-9 and RQ-4 offer a cost-effective way to deter opportunistic aggression by China in the Western Pacific or Russia in Eastern Europe.

5. Keep promoting innovation.

A downturn in the defense budget should not become an excuse for conservatism. To the contrary, it should spur innovation. For example, fiscal austerity provides an opportunity to reform the military health care system and downsize basing infrastructure. Now is also the time to explore ways to make military training more effective and cost-efficient through the adoption of approaches such as live, virtual, constructive training. There are also opportunities to realize savings through greater outsourcing of maintenance and logistics.

Whereas the defense primes employ the most workers, in a number of cases smaller companies have been the source of some of the most innovative approaches to defense in areas such as unmanned systems, expendable aircraft, space innovations, networked solutions and cyber. Supporting smaller, innovative companies should thus be a priority.

The Defense Department and Congress should also take an active role in supporting key segments of the defense-industrial base. Areas such as hypersonics, directed energy and unmanned systems that hold the key to effectiveness tomorrow will need support today.

6. Share costs.

Finally, the United States should take every opportunity to promote arms exports, which both create jobs and increase the security of our allies. Much more should be done to increase the speed and predictability of the arms export process. In addition, with few exceptions, U.S. weapons should be developed with export in mind. We should avoid a repetition of the case of the F-22 aircraft, which was designed from birth never to be exported.

We need to learn from the past in developing the next generation of weapons. For example, in recent months, Australian defense analysts have discussed the attractiveness of the B-21 Raider stealth bomber for Australia's defense needs. Export of the B-21 to a close ally such as Australia, should Canberra so desire, should be given serious consideration.

The current situation is challenging, with even more difficult times to come. If we are smart, however, we can both keep Americans at work and get what we need for national defense.

<https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2020/04/24/six-ways-the-us-can-maximize-its-strategic-benefit-from-defense-spending/>

The Five Surprises in Pentagon's 2022 Budget

Mark Cancian | *Breaking Defense* | June 10, 2021

Many elements of the Biden Administration's first defense budget had been signaled ahead of time: focus on climate, cuts to "legacy" platforms, and an emphasis on developing future technologies.

What were the surprises? Unchanged Army end strength, a strong nuclear modernization program, the absence of new unmanned systems, a resilient F-35 program, and a shrinking Navy.

The Shrinking Navy!

Most observers had expected an increase in the Navy's shipbuilding accounts with this budget, especially after the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Mark Milley, said that, even as an Army general, he would support budget increases for the Navy and Air Force in light of the Chinese threat.

But this budget decommissions 12 ships early (seven cruisers, five previously planned plus two additional, an LPD amphibious ship, and four LCSs) and buys relatively few replacements. Some of the ship commissionings, especially the cruisers and amphib, had been expected since the Navy has fought with Congress about extending their service lives. However, the LCSs had only been in service four to nine years out of a potential 30-year lifespan. The budget proposes buying only eight battle force ships, of which four are combatants (one DDG 51, one frigate, and two Virginia-class submarines). Assuming a 30-year service life, that implies a fleet of only 240 ships.

The Obama administration had set the fleet size at 308 ships. The Trump administration increased that to 355 ships, which Congress codified into law. Mark Esper, just before he resigned as Defense Secretary, proposed a fleet of "500+" ships that included a large number of unmanned vessels. Although congressional members have expressed skepticism about such a high target, many Democrats, particularly those from shipbuilding districts, have endorsed some naval expansion.

In the past, the Navy accelerated the deactivation of ships to save money, for example, in the early 1970s and in the 1990s. However, after the declines, it has never been able to build the numbers back up to where they were. Thus, the Navy is likely to be headed for a smaller fleet (290 manned ships?), though one that is younger and more capable.

Unchanged Army End Strength.

Most observers expected the Army's troop- numbers would shrink to help pay both for Army internal programs and for Navy and Air Force programs designed to counter China. The Army's budget was, indeed, cut by \$3.6 billion (though some of that reflects reduced operations in Afghanistan), but the end strength cut did not happen, at least not yet.

The budget proposes an Army end strength of 485,000, essentially its level today. The Army was quite upfront that its priorities were end strength, readiness, and modernization, so it protected end strength at the cost of other elements. Historically, the Army has prioritized personnel and end strength, seeing them as its institutional core.

Further, the Army had been on a strategic communications campaign to argue that its size needed to be sustained. The Army points to its major role in the Pacific with ballistic missile defense, long-range

precision fires, and theater-wide logistics. It also argues that its extensive day-to-day deployments put a floor on its size. These efforts seem to have paid off, at least in the short term.

The Army remains in a precarious position. Strategists see it as a bill payer for other priorities, particularly naval and air. Many elements of its program will decline in FY 2022—readiness, training, and modernization—as Tom Spoehr at Heritage Foundation notes. The bottom line: the Army will need more money if it wants to hold onto its people.

Vibrant Nuclear Modernization.

Arms-control advocates have been hammering the Biden administration about curbing nuclear modernization, arguing that the effort is “unnecessary and costly.” The Democratic Party’s platform denounced “the reckless embrace of a new arms race.”

But the Biden Administration’s first budget strongly supports all three legs of the triad. The three major nuclear modernization programs all would receive funding increases and large budgets: B-21 (+\$30M, to nearly \$3 billion), Columbia class ballistic missile submarine (+\$509M to \$5 billion), and the Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD, +\$1.1 billion, to \$2.6 billion).

This nuclear budget did not come out of thin air. The Obama administration developed a nuclear modernization package in 2010 as a complement to New START. The United States would reduce its nuclear forces but modernize the remainder. Although Democrats have been expected to continue with the Obama program (and many Biden administration officials served in the Obama administration), some programs are vulnerable. The long-range standoff missile (LRSO), a nuclear-tipped cruise missile, had been part of the Obama program, but the arms-control community opposed it strongly. Still, the program’s proposed funding increased by \$224 million, to \$609 million. GBSD had always been controversial with arms-control advocates for reasons of both cost and vulnerability, but the Biden budget sustained it.

Funding the nuclear modernization programs may be, in part, a negotiating tactic for expected arms-control negotiations with Russia, and, conceivably, China. There is no point in giving away bargaining chips before the negotiation even begins. Further, the administration will conduct a nuclear posture review that might set a different path. Nevertheless, it would be hard to back away from the FY 2022 commitment to these programs without strong justification.

Few Drones Requested

Repeated statements about the need for new technologies, new operating concepts, and the importance

of innovation would have led one to believe that unmanned systems would receive a large boost. In fact, they are just sputtering along. Indeed, the Pentagon will divest itself of a range of large drones if the budget is approved. The Air Force plans to divest MQ-4 block 30 Global Hawks; the Navy to divest its remaining four BAMS-D, and the Marine Corps to divest the disappointing RQ-21s.

The services plan to buy few unmanned aircraft. The Army, for its part, plans to have 60 manned aircraft and no major unmanned systems. The Air Force buys 91 manned aircraft, no unmanned systems. The Department of the Navy buys 101 manned aircraft and six unmanned aircraft. The Navy buys no MQ-4C Tritons, continuing a multiyear “pause” for additional development and continues development of the MQ-25 as a refueling aircraft (but no procurement yet). The Marine Corps buys six “Medium Altitude Long Endurance-Tactical (MALE-T) Unmanned Aerial Systems,” which is odd budget nomenclature, lacking a name and designation. Budget details indicate that MALE-T is actually the MQ-9A Extended Range. (Note to Marine Corps: if your budget presentation is unclear about what you are asking for, that will be a red flag to Congress.)

Overall, this Air Force and Navy funding balance between manned and unmanned does not indicate a change in approach. Indeed, it constitutes a resounding endorsement of manned over unmanned systems.

The Persistence Of The F-35.

One year ago, the F 35 program seemed to be stable, having reached a steady production level and established control over its schedule and cost (though not quite over its operational tests and performance). Then, Adam Smith, chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, denounced the program: “I want to stop throwing money down that particular rat hole.” The Joint Staff planned a review of tactical aviation programs with an expectation of changing the mix. Gen. Brown, Chief of Staff of the Air Force, promised a clean sheet design of Air Force tactical aviation. The vultures seemed to be circling.

But the 2022 budget request gives no indication of serious trouble. Total program spending is down slightly but remains greater than \$12 billion a year. The budget proposes buying 85 aircraft in 2022, down from 96 in FY 2021 but more than what had been requested in FY 2021 (79) before congressional ads. The Air Force requests 48 aircraft, the same level as requested in 2021 and about the same level the Air Force has requested for several years.

The Marine Corps had signaled concerns about the F-35. Gen. David Burger had said in his commandant’s planning guidance: “It is unlikely that exquisite manned platforms represent a complete answer to our needs in future warfare. . . . This means a significant increase in unmanned systems.” Yet, the Corps

buys 22 F-35s, more than the 15 for the Navy.

When the administration completes all its strategic reviews, the hammer may still fall on the F-35, but it escaped the blow in this budget.

Of course, the 2022 budget is only an interim product since the Biden administration only had a few months to consider it. The administration could change course on these five items when the department completes its various strategic reviews. Those results will be published with the 2023 budget, the first week in February or perhaps, as the Trump administration did, a few weeks earlier. Nevertheless, the choices in FY 2022 establish facts on the ground...at least until Congress gets its say.

Seizing Opportunities: Four National Security Questions to Ask About the Use of Satellites in 5G Networks

Dr. Melissa Griffith | *Wilson Center* / September 2021

Executive Summary

In order to deliver on the full promise of the fifth generation of mobile (5G) networks (near ubiquitous, instantaneous coverage for a massive number of connected devices), satellites will need to play a far more central role within telecommunications networks going forward with both terrestrial and space-based components working in tandem for a wider diversity of functions. Given the evolution of the satellite industry, both in terms of business models and technology, that greater role is now increasingly possible. Yet, while much of the focus on the national security implications of 5G to date in the United States and abroad has been on the terrestrial components of these networks (e.g. Internet of Things (IoT) and mobile devices, radio heads and towers, fiber, the core network, etc.), the potential role of satellite communications systems in these networks has been largely overlooked and/or poorly misunderstood. What steps, therefore, should we prioritize today to ensure greater security and resilience of 5G networks now and in the future? Put another way: if you are a policy maker concerned with the potential data-centric national security risks associated with reliance on satellite segments by 5G telecommunications networks, what questions should you ask and why do the answers to those questions matter?

Full Text available: <https://acrosskarman.wilsoncenter.org/publication/seizing-opportunities-four-national-security-questions-ask-about-use-satellites-5g>

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Moderator Biographies

Dr. Bill Godnick

Dr. William ‘Bill’ Godnick joined the Perry Center as Professor of Practice in September 2016 after a career as Public Security Program Coordinator for the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean leading technical assistance programs on conventional arms control, nonproliferation, forensic ballistics, private security regulation and armed violence reduction strategies. Prior to that, Dr. Godnick worked as a Senior Policy Advisor for Latin America with the British organization International Alert. During that time, his efforts focused on supporting the Office of the Vice President of Colombia in building a coalition of government agencies, multinational and state-owned extractive industry and civil society for the implementation of the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights, a multi-stakeholder code of conduct guiding company and security forces operations in conflict zones.

Bill holds a BS in International Business from San Francisco State University (1992) and an MA in International Policy Studies from the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey (1997). In 2010, he completed his PhD from the Department of Peace Studies at the University of Bradford in the United Kingdom. His doctoral dissertation was titled “An examination of the impact of voluntary weapons collection programs on citizen security in Latin America.” Dr. Godnick is currently an adjunct professorial lecturer at the American University School of International Service and has taught graduate and undergraduate courses in global and Latin American politics, in English and Spanish, at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey, California State University Monterey Bay and Barry University in Miami, Florida.

Dr. Godnick currently leads the Perry Center’s academic offerings in Human Rights and the Rule of Law and Caribbean Defense and Security and provides support to the Strategy and Defense Policy and the Countering Transnational Threat Networks courses. He has lived in the Bahamas, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Peru and worked in more than 20 countries in the Western Hemisphere. His current research focuses on the strategic use of social media in the defense and security sectors.

Dr. Pat Paterson

Pat Paterson is a Professor of Practice at the William J. Perry Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies (WJPC). A 1989 graduate of the US Naval Academy in Annapolis, Maryland, he retired from the Navy as a Commander in 2009. His last assignment was as the Political-Military Advisor on the Fourth Fleet staff in Mayport, FL. He completed his PhD in Conflict Resolution at Nova Southeastern University where his research focuses on negotiations with military institutions during post-conflict transitions to democracy. He has a Master's degree in National Security Studies from the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA, a Masters equivalent from the Argentina Naval War College in Buenos Aires, Argentina, and a Master's degree in Political Science from the American University in Washington, DC. He is the author of four books and numerous defense and security related articles in journals such as *The Journal of Military Ethics*, *Military Review*, *Armed Forces Journal*, *Proceedings Magazine*, *Joint Force Quarterly*, *Naval History*, *The Journal of International Affairs*, and *Security and Defense Studies Review*. His latest book, *The Blurred Battlefield* (JSOU Press, 2021), addresses the need for hybrid doctrines on the use of force for Latin American militaries combating violent crime groups. His principal areas of expertise include civil-military relations, human rights, rule of law, international humanitarian law, and U.S. and Latin American history.

Dr. Fabiana Sofia Perera

Fabiana Sofia Perera is an Assistant Professor at the William J. Perry Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies. Prior to joining the Perry Center, Fabiana was a Rosenthal Fellow at the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Under Secretary for Policy, Western Hemisphere Affairs. Fabiana has experience working in the public and private sectors. She worked as a research associate at Mitsubishi International Corporation focusing on Latin America and the energy and infrastructure sectors. She also has experience serving at the Department of Veterans Affairs and the US Agency for International Development (USAID).

Fabiana holds an MA in Latin American Studies from Georgetown University and earned a PhD in Political Science from The George Washington University. For her doctorate, Fabiana completed fieldwork in Venezuela and Ecuador. Fabiana has presented her research at the annual meetings of the American Political Science Association and the Latin American Studies Association. Her research and analysis have appeared in numerous publications including *The Washington Post*, *CNN.com*, and *War on the Rocks*. Her research has been supported by numerous organizations including Columbia University's Women in Energy program and George Washington University's Center for International Business Education.

Dr. Boris Saavedra

Dr. Boris Saavedra is a retired Venezuelan Air Force General Officer, having served in all operational positions in that service. He has devoted more than 30 years of his professional life to academic activities, both in Venezuela and the United States. His duties have ranged from flight instructor and professor to Director of the Armed Forces Basic School and Commander of the Air Defense Command in Venezuela. Dr. Saavedra is a graduate of the Venezuelan Air Force Academy, where he received a Bachelor's degree in Science and Military Arts, with an emphasis in Aeronautics. He successfully completed all courses and specializations in air operations as a combat pilot. He graduated from the higher Military Studies course at the *École Supérieure de Guerre Interarmées* of France (1983-1986) and the Higher National Defense Course at the Institute of Higher Studies in National Defense of Venezuela (1988-1989). In addition to his doctorate from the Gutiérrez Mellado Institute at the National Distance Education University in Spain (2014), he has an MA in International Policy and Practice from George Washington University in the United States (2003). In his area of specialization, Peace and International Security, he has co-authored several books and articles in journals in Spain, England, Colombia, Chile, the United States, El Salvador and Venezuela on civil-military relations in Latin America, public and private security, transnational crime, terrorism, and strategic planning and military capacity, and new emerging digital technology in cybersecurity and robotics.

Dr. Saavedra is currently an Associate Professor at the William J. Perry Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, located at National Defense University in Washington, DC, a position he has held since 1998. Before assuming this position, Dr. Saavedra was the Chief of Academics at the Inter-American Defense College (1996-1998). In Venezuela, his last position was Director of the Secretariat at the Ministry of National Defense (1995-96).

Dr. David Spencer

Dr. David Spencer is an associate professor at the William J. Perry Center. From 2014-2017 he was in detail as the Colombia/South America desk officer at the Office of the Secretary of Defense Counternarcotics & Global Threats. He also served from 2011-2012 as the Colombia Policy Director in the Office of the Secretary of Defense Western Hemisphere Affairs. Dr. Spencer earned his doctorate in Political Science from George Washington University in 2002 where he studied Latin American Politics, specializing in regional insurgency and terrorism. He earned his MA and BA (both in International Relations) from Brigham Young University in 1992 and 1988 respectively.

Before accepting his current position at the Perry Center, Dr. Spencer was Director of Combating Terrorism at Hicks & Associates. In this position he supported several USSOUTHCOM projects. For the

last 15 years he has worked in a variety of positions in Support of Plan Colombia. He spent five years in El Salvador as a consultant to the Ministry of Defense during the recent civil war.

Dr. Spencer has worked for a number of think-tanks and consulting firms, such as Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) and Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC). Dr. Spencer was raised in Latin America, living in Chile, Costa Rica, Colombia, Venezuela, and Guatemala. Dr. Spencer served in the US Army and National Guard as an Infantryman. He attained the rank of Sergeant and was mobilized for the First Gulf War in 1990-1991. In June 2011, he published the study *Colombia's Road to Recovery: Security and Governance 1982-2010*. He was awarded the Exceptional Public Service Medal in 2013. He is a military history and archaeology buff.

Dr. Scott Tollefson

Dr. Scott D. Tollefson received his Ph.D. in International Relations from The Johns Hopkins University Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). He has an M.A. in Hispanic Civilization from the University of California, Santa Barbara. He taught in the Department of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School (1988–1999), where he also served as Associate Chairman for Academic Administration, Associate Chairman for Instruction, and Coordinator for Western Hemisphere Regional Security Studies. At NPS he received the Commendation for Excellence in Teaching. During this period he was also an Adjunct Professor at the Monterey Institute of International Studies (MIIS), Graduate School of International Policy Studies. He was the Director of the M.A. Program in Political Science at Kansas State University (1999–2004), where he served as a member of the Truman Scholarship Committee. From 2004 to 2010 he worked for the Saudi Aramco Oil Company, in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, as an educator and curriculum developer. Since 2010 Dr. Tollefson has been a Professor in the William J. Perry Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, and has served as Associate Dean of Academic Affairs (2012-2015) and Dean of Faculty and Academic Affairs (2015-present). In 2013 he received the Director's Award for Superior Service. Over the years Dr. Tollefson has attended professional conferences in Argentina, Bahrain, Barbados, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Egypt, El Salvador, Greece, Jamaica, Jordan, Mexico, Peru, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Thailand, Trinidad & Tobago, and the United States.

Previously, Dr. Tollefson was a Visiting Researcher at the Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales (FLACSO) in Santiago, Chile (1993-1994); a Visiting Researcher at the Universidade de Brasília, Brazil (1987); and a Visiting Scholar at the Instituto Universitário de Pesquisas do Rio de Janeiro (IUPERJ), Brazil (1986). He was a recipient of an Andrew Mellon Foundation grant to conduct research in the Caribbean (1984).

Tollefson is the co-editor (with Thomas C. Bruneau) of *Who Guards the Guardians and How: Democratic Civil-Military Relations* (University of Texas Press, 2006), which received the Choice Outstanding Academic Title. He is also the co-author (with Bruneau) of “Civil-Military Relations in Brazil: A Reassessment,” in the *Journal of Politics in Latin America* (2014). He is the author of numerous chapters and articles on defense and security issues in Latin America, Brazil’s international relations, and civil-military relations. Dr. Tollefson grew up in Brazil, has lived and worked in Chile, Jamaica, and Saudi Arabia, and is fluent in English, Portuguese, and Spanish.

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WILLIAM J. PERRY CENTER *for*
HEMISPHERIC DEFENSE STUDIES

National Defense University
Abraham Lincoln Hall
260 5th Avenue, Building 64
Washington, DC 20319-5066